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Abstract. Recent research in quantum cryptography has led to the development
of schemes that encrypt and authenticate quantum messages with computational
security. The security definitions used so far in the literature are asymptotic, game-
based, and not known to be composable. We show how to define finite, composable,
computational security for secure quantum message transmission. The new defini-
tions do not involve any games or oracles, they are directly operational: a scheme
is secure if it transforms an insecure channel and a shared key into an ideal secure
channel from Alice to Bob, i.e., one which only allows Eve to block messages and
learn their size, but not change them or read them. By modifying the ideal channel
to provide Eve with more or less capabilities, one gets an array of different security
notions. By design these transformations are composable, resulting in composable
security.
Crucially, the new definitions are finite. Security does not rely on the asymptotic
hardness of a computational problem. Instead, one proves a finite reduction: if
an adversary can distinguish the constructed (real) channel from the ideal one
(for some fixed security parameters), then she can solve a finite instance of some
computational problem. Such a finite statement is needed to make security claims
about concrete implementations.
We then prove that (slightly modified versions of) protocols proposed in the lit-
erature satisfy these composable definitions. And finally, we study the relations
between some game-based definitions and our composable ones. In particular, we
look at notions of quantum authenticated encryption and QCCA2, and show that
they suffer from the same issues as their classical counterparts: they exclude certain
protocols which are arguably secure.
1 Introduction
At its core, a security definition is a set of mathematical conditions, and a security
proof consists in showing that these conditions hold for a given protocol. Given
various security definitions, one may analyze which are stronger and weaker by
proving reductions or finding separating examples. This however does not tell us
which definitions one should use, since too weak definitions may have security
issues and too strong definitions may exclude protocols that are arguably secure.
For example, IND-CCA2 is often considered an unnecessarily strong security def-
inition, since taking a scheme which is IND-CCA2 and appending a bit to the
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ciphertext results in a new encryption scheme that is arguably as secure as the
original scheme, but does not satisfy IND-CCA2 [CKN03,CMT13].
In this work we take a more critical approach to defining security. We ask what
criteria a security definition needs to satisfy that are both necessary and sufficient
conditions to call a protocol “secure”. We then apply them to the problem of
encrypting and authenticating quantum messages with computational security in
the symmetric-key setting.
1.1 A Security Desideratum
Operational security. Common security definitions for encryption and authenti-
cation found in the literature are game-based, i.e., they require that an adversary
cannot win a game such as guessing what message has been encrypted given access
to certain oracles, see, e.g., [BDPR98] and [KY06] for comparisons of various such
games in the public-key and private-key settings, respectively. These have been
adapted for transmitting quantum messages: a definition for QCPA has been pro-
posed in [BJ15], QCCA1 in [ABF+16], and QCCA2 as well as notions of quantum
unforgeability and quantum authenticated encryption in [AGM18]. These are just
some of the security games one can imagine— in the classical, symmetric-key set-
ting, [KY06] analyzes 18 different security notions. A natural question is then to
ask which of these games are the relevant ones, for which ones is it both necessary
and sufficient that an adversary cannot win them. And the general answer is: we
do not know.
Through such cryptographic protocols one wishes to prevent an adversary
from learning some part of a message or modifying a message undetected. But
it is generally unclear how such game-based security definitions relate to these
operational notions— we refer to [MRT12] for a more in-depth critique of game-
based security. Instead, one should directly define security operationally.1 In this
work we follow the constructive paradigm of [MR11,Mau12,MR16], and define a
protocol to be secure if it constructs a channel with the desired properties, e.g.,
only leaks the message size or only allows the adversary to block the message, but
not change it or insert new messages.
Composable security. A second drawback of the definitions proposed so far in
the literature for computational security of quantum message transmission [BJ15,
ABF+16,AGM18] is that they are not (proven to be) composable. A long history
of work on composable security has shown that analyzing a protocol in an isolated
1Note that once a game-based definition has been proven to capture operational notions
such as confidentiality or authenticity (e.g., via a reduction), then the game-based criterion
may become a benchmark for designing schemes with the desired security; see the discussion in
Section 1.6.
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setting does not imply that it is actually secure when one considers the environ-
ment in which it is used. When performing such a composable security analysis,
one sometimes finds that the definitions used are inappropriate but the protocols
are actually secure like for quantum key distribution [Ren05,BHL+05,KRBM07],
that the definitions are still secure (up to a loss of security parameter) like for
delegated quantum computation [DFPR14], or that not only the definitions but
also the protocols are insecure like in relativistic and bounded storage bit commit-
ment and (biased) coin tossing [VPdR17].2 It is thus necessary for a protocol to
be proven to satisfy a composable security definition before it may be considered
(provably) secure and safely used in an arbitrary environment.
Finite security. A third problem with the aforementioned security definitions
is that they are all asymptotic. This means that the protocols have a security
parameter k ∈ N— formally, one considers a sequence of protocols {Πk}k∈N— and
security is defined in the limit when k →∞. An implementation of a protocol will
however always be finite, e.g., the honest players choose a specific parameter k0
which they consider to be sufficient and run Πk0 . A security proof for k →∞ does
not tell us anything about security for any specific parameter k0 and thus does not
tell us anything about the security of Πk0 , which is run by the honest players. To
resolve this issue, some works consider what is called concrete security [BDJR97],
i.e., instead of hiding parameters in O-notation, security bounds and reductions
are given explicitly. This is a first step at obtaining finite security, but it still
considers the security of a sequence {Πk}k∈N instead of security of the individual
elements Πk0 in this sequence. For example, one still considers adversaries that
are polynomial in k, simulators that must be efficient in k, and errors that are
negligible in k. But the security definition of some Πk0 should not depend on any
other elements in the sequence, on how the sequence is defined or whether it is
defined at all. Hence notions such as poly-time, efficiency, or negligibility should
not be part of a security definition for some specific Πk0 . We call the security
paradigm that analyzes individual elements Πk0 finite security, and show in this
work how to define it for computational security of quantum message transmission.
1.2 Overview of Results
Our contributions are threefold. We first provide definitions for encryption and
authentication of quantum messages that satisfy the desideratum expressed above.
In particular, we show how to define finite security in the computational case. In
Section 1.3 below we explain the intuition behind this security paradigm.
2Note that a negative result in a composable framework only proves that a protocol does not
construct the desired ideal functionality. This does not exclude that the protocol may construct
some other ideal functionality or may be secure given some additional set-up assumptions.
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We then show that (slightly modified) protocols from the literature [ABF+16,
AGM18] satisfy these definitions. These protocols use the quantum one-time
pad and quantum information-theoretic authentication as subroutine [BCG+02,
Por17], but run them with keys that are only computationally secure to encrypt
multiple messages. We explain the constructions and what is achieved in more
detail in Section 1.4.
Now that we have security definitions that satisfy our desideratum, we revisit
some game-based definitions from the literature, and compare them to our own
notions of security. An overview of these results is given in Section 1.5.
1.3 Finite Computational Security
In traditional asymptotic security, a cryptographic protocol is parameterized by
a single value k ∈ N— any other parameters must be expressed as a function
of k— and one studies a sequence of objects {Πk}k∈N. In composable security,
one uses this to define a parameterized real world R = {Rk}k∈N and ideal world
S = {Sk}k∈N, and argues that no polynomial distinguisher D = {Dk}k∈N can
distinguish one from the other with non-negligible advantage. At first glance the
notions of polynomial distinguishers and negligible functions might seem essen-
tial, because an unbounded distinguisher can obviously distinguish the two, and
without a notion of negligibility, how can one define what is a satisfactory bound
on the distinguishability.
The latter problem is the simpler to address: instead of categorizing distin-
guishability as black or white (negligible or not), we give explicit bounds. The
former issue is resolved by observing that we never actually prove that the real
and ideal world are indistinguishable (except in the case of information-theoretic
security), since in most cases that would amount to solving a problem such as
P 6= NP. What one actually proves is a reduction, which is a finite statement, not
an asymptotic one. More precisely, one proves that if Dk can distinguish Rk from
Sk with advantage pk, then some (explicit) D
′
k can solve some problem Wk with
probability p′k— if one believes that Wk is asymptotically hard to solve, then this
implies that D cannot distinguish R from S.
A finite security statement stops after the reduction. We prove that for any
k0 and any Dk0 ,
dDk0 (Rk0 , Sk0) ≤ f(Dk0), (1)
where dDk0 (·, ·) denotes the advantage Dk0 has in distinguishing two given systems,
and f(·) is some arbitrary function, e.g., the probability that D′k0 (which is itself
some function of Dk0) can solve some problem Wk0 .
Equation 1 does not require systems to be part of a sequence with a single
security parameter k ∈ N. There may be no security parameter at all, or multiple
parameters. Information-theoretic security corresponds to the special case where
one can prove that f(Dk0) is small for all Dk0 .
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1.4 Constructing Quantum Channels
As mentioned in Section 1.1, we use the Abstract and Constructive Cryptography
(AC) framework of Maurer and Renner [MR11, Mau12, MR16] in this work. To
define the security of a message transmission protocol, we need to first define the
type of channel we wish to achieve — for simplicity, we always consider channels
going from Alice to Bob.
The strongest channel we construct in this work is an ordered secure quantum
channel, OSC, which allows Eve to decide which messages that Alice sent will be
delivered to Bob and which ones get discarded. But it does not reveal any infor-
mation about the messages (except their size and number) to Eve and guarantees
that the delivered messages arrive in the same order in which they were sent. A
somewhat weaker channel, a secure channel SC, also allows Eve to block or deliver
each message, but additionally allows her to jumble their order of arrival at Bob’s.
Our first result shows that a modified version of a protocol from [AGM18]
constructs the strongest channel, OSC, from an insecure channel and a short key
that is used to select a function from a pseudo-random family (PRF). Security
holds for any distinguisher that cannot distinguish the output of the PRF from
the output of a uniform function. We also show how one can construct OSC from
SC by simply appending a counter to the messages.
The two channels described above are labeled “secure”, because they are both
confidential (Eve does not learn anything about the messages) and authentic (Eve
cannot change or insert any messages). If we are willing to sacrifice authenticity,
we can define weaker channels that allow Eve to modify or insert messages in
specific ways. We define a non-malleable confidential channel, NMCC — which
does not allow Eve to change a message sent by Alice, but does allow her to insert
a message of her choice — and a Pauli-malleable channel, PMCC— which allows
Eve to apply bit and phase flips to Alice’s messages or insert a fully mixed state.
Our second construction modifies a protocol from [ABF+16] to construct
PMCC from an insecure channel and a short key that is used to select a function
from a pseudo-random family (PRF). Here too, security holds for any distinguisher
that cannot distinguish the PRF from uniform.
1.5 Comparison to Game-Based Definitions
In the last part of this work, we relate existing game-based security definitions
for quantum encryption with our new proposed security definitions phrased in
constructive cryptography. More concretely, we focus on the notions of quantum
ciphertext indistinguishability under adaptive chosen-ciphertext attack (QCCA2)
and quantum authenticated encryption (QAE), both introduced in [AGM18].
We first note that encryption schemes are defined to be stateless in [BJ15,
ABF+16, AGM18] and the proposed game-based definitions are tailored to such
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schemes. The restricted class of encryption protocols analyzed can thus not con-
struct ordered channels, because the players need to remember tags numbering
the messages to be able to preserve this ordering. The strongest notion of encryp-
tion from these works, namely QAE, is thus closest to constructing a SC. In fact,
we show that QAE is strictly stronger than constructing a SC: a scheme satisfying
QAE constructs a SC, however there are (stateless) schemes constructing a SC that
would be considered insecure by the QAE game. These schemes are obtained in
the same way as the ones showing that classical IND-CCA2 is unnecessarily strong:
one starts with a scheme satisfying QAE and appends a bit to the ciphertext, re-
sulting in a new scheme that still constructs a SC, but is not QAE-secure. Our
proof shows that QAE may be seen as constructing a SC with a fixed simulator
that is hard-coded in the game. A composable security definition only requires the
existence of a simulator, and the separation between the two notions is obtained
by considering schemes that can be proven secure using a different simulator than
the one hard-coded in the game.
For QCCA2, we first propose an alternative game-based security notion that
captures the same intuition, but which we consider more natural than the one
suggested in [AGM18]. In particular, its classical analogue is easily shown to
be equivalent to a standard IND-CCA2 notion, whereas the notion put forth in
[AGM18], when cast to a classical definition, incurs a concrete constant factor
loss when compared to IND-CCA2, and requires a complicated proof of this fact.
We then show that for a restricted class of protocols (which includes all the ones
for which a security proof is given in previous work), our new game-based notion
indeed implies that the protocol constructs a NMCC. The same separation holds
here as well: QCCA2 definitions are unnecessarily strong, and exclude protocols
that naturally construct a NMCC. Note that in the classical case, the IND-RCCA
game [CKN03] that was developed to avoid the problems of IND-CCA2 has been
shown to be exactly equivalent to constructing a classical non-malleable confiden-
tial channel in the case of large message spaces [CMT13].
1.6 Alternative Security Notions
Common security definitions often capture properties of (encryption) schemes,
e.g., let M be a plaintext random variable, let C be the corresponding ciphertext,
H is the entropy function, M ′ is the received plaintext, and accept is the event
that the message is accepted by the receiver, then
H(M |C) = H(M) and Pr[M 6= M ′ and accept] ≤ ε (2)
are simple notions of confidentiality and authenticity, respectively. But depending
on how schemes satisfying these equations are used — e.g., encrypt-then-authen-
Composable and Finite Computational Security of Quantum Message Trans. 7
ticate or authenticate-then-encrypt — one gets drastically different results.3 The
equations in (2) may be regarded as crucial security properties of encryption
schemes, but before schemes satisfying these may be safely used, one needs to
consider the context and prove what is actually achieved by such constructs (in
an operational sense).
The same applies to security definitions proposed for quantum key distribu-
tion. The accessible information4 and the trace distance criterion5 capture dif-
ferent properties of a secret key. If a scheme satisfying the former is used with
an insecure quantum channel, then the resulting key could be insecure, but if the
channel only allows the adversary to measure and store classical information, then
the key has information-theoretic security [KRBM07,PR14]. A scheme satisfying
the latter notion — the trace distance criterion — constructs a secure key even
when the quantum channel used is completely insecure [Ren05, BHL+05, PR14].
Neither criterion is a satisfactory security definition on its own, they both require
a further analysis to prove whether a protocol satisfying them does indeed dis-
tribute a secure key. But now that this has been done [BHL+05,PR14], the trace
distance criterion has become a reference for what a quantum key distribution
scheme must satisfy [SBPC+09,TL17].
Previous works on the computational security of quantum message transmis-
sion [BJ15,ABF+16,AGM18] as well as the new definition of QCCA2 proposed on
this paper may be viewed in the same light. These game-based definitions capture
properties of encryption schemes. But before a scheme satisfying these definitions
may be safely used, one needs to analyze how the scheme is used and what is
achieved by it. The constructive definitions introduced in this work and the re-
ductions from the game-based definitions do exactly this. As a result of this, QAE
or QCCA2 may be used as a benchmark for future schemes — though unlike the
trace distance criterion, they are only sufficient criteria, not necessary ones.
1.7 Other Related Work
The desideratum expressed in Section 1.1 is the fruit of many different lines of
research that go back to the late 90’s. We give an incomplete overview of some of
this work in this section.
Composable security was introduced independently by Pfitzmann and Waid-
ner [PW00, PW01, BPW04, BPW07] and Canetti [Can01, CDPW07, Can13], who
3Encrypt-then-authenticate is always secure, but one can find examples of schemes satisfying
(2) following the authenticate-then-encrypt paradigm that are insecure [BN00,Kra01,MT10].
4Iacc(K;E) := maxΓ I(K; Γ(E)), where ρKE is the joint state of the secret key K and the
adversary’s information E, and Γ(E) is the random variable resulting from measuring the E
system with a POVM Γ.
5‖ρKE − τK ⊗ ρE‖, where ρKE is the joint state of the secret key K and the adversary’s
information E and τK is a fully mixed state.
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each defined their own framework, dubbed reactive simulatability and univer-
sal composability (UC), respectively. Unruh adapted UC to the quantum set-
ting [Unr10], whereas Maurer and Renner’s AC applies to any model of compu-
tation, classical or quantum [MR11]. Quantum UC may however not be used for
finite security without substantial modifications, since it hard-codes asymptotic
security in the framework: machines are defined by sequences of operators
{E(k)}
k
,
where k ∈ N is a security parameter, and distinguishability between networks of
machines is then defined asymptotically in k.6
Concrete security [BDJR97] addresses the issues of reductions and parameters
being hidden in O-notation by requiring them to be explicit. Theses works con-
sider distinguishing advantages (or game winning probabilities) as a function of
the allowed complexity or running time of the distinguisher, and aim at proving
as tight statements a possible. In such an approach, one would have to define a
precise computational model. This, however, is avoided, meaning that any model
in a certain class of meaningful models is considered equivalent. This unavoidably
means that the security statements are asymptotic, at least with an unspecified
linear or sublinear term. In contrast, the objects we consider, including distin-
guishers, are discrete systems and are directly composed as such, without need
for considering a computational model for implementing the systems.
In the classical case, a model of discrete systems that may be used for finite
security is random systems [Mau02,MPR07]. Generalizations to the quantum case
have been proposed by Gutoski and Watrous [GW07, Gut12] — and called quan-
tum strategies — by Chiribella, D’Ariano and Perinotti [CDP09]— called quantum
combs — and by Hardy [Har11,Har12,Har15]— operator tensors. A model for dis-
crete quantum systems that can additionally model time and superpositions of
causal structures is the causal boxes framework [PMM+17].
None of the previous works on computational security of quantum message
transmission satisfy any of the three criteria outlined in Section 1.1. These criteria
are however standard by now for quantum key distribution [PR14, TL17]. In the
classical case, they have also been used for computational security, e.g., [MRT12,
CMT13].
1.8 Structure of this Paper
In Section 2 we introduce the elements needed from AC [MR11,Mau12,MR16], and
from the discrete system model with which we instantiate AC, namely quantum
6The object about which ones makes a security statement is quite different in an asymptotic
and a finite framework. In the former it is an infinite sequence of behaviors (e.g., a machine in
UC), whereas in the later it is an element in such a sequence (the sequence itself is not necessarily
well-defined). One thus composes different objects in the two models, and a composition theorem
in one model does not immediately translate to a composition theorem in the other.
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combs [CDP09]. This allows us to define the notion of a finite construction of a re-
source (e.g., a secure channel) from another resource (e.g., an insecure channel and
a key). In Section 3 we first define the channels and other resources needed in this
work. Then we give protocols and prove that they construct various confidential
and secure channels, as outlined in Section 1.4. Finally, in Section 4 we compare
our security definitions to some game-based ones from the literature [AGM18] and
prove the results described in Section 1.5.
2 Abstract & Constructive Cryptography
In this section we give a brief introduction to the Abstract and Constructive
Cryptography (AC) framework. This framework views cryptography as a resource
theory. Players may share certain resources— e.g., secret key, an authentic chan-
nel, a public-key infrastructure, common reference strings, etc. — and use these
to construct other resources — e.g., an authentic channel, a secure channel, se-
cret key, a bit commitment resource, an idealization of a multipartite function,
etc. A protocol is thus a map between resources. We give an overview of this in
Section 2.1 and refer to [MR11,Mau12,PR14,MR16] for further reading.
To illustrate how this framework is used, we model known examples from the
literature in Section 2.2 and Section 2.3, namely one-time authentication and en-
cryption of quantum messages in the cases of both information-theoretic security
and computational security, respectively. In Appendix A we define the (quantum)
notation that we use throughout this paper.
The resource theory from Section 2.1 does not depend on the model of sys-
tems considered— it may be instantiated with classical or quantum systems, syn-
chronous or asynchronous communication, sequential or timed scheduling. In this
work we consider asynchronous, sequential, quantum communication. This type
of system has been studied by Gutoski and Watrous [GW07, Gut12], Chiribella,
D’Ariano and Perinotti [CDP09], and Hardy [Har11, Har12, Har15], and we refer
to it in the following using the term from [CDP09], namely quantum combs. Quan-
tum combs are a generalization of random systems [Mau02,MPR07] to quantum
information theory. In Section 2.4 we give an brief overview of quantum combs,
and refer to the literature above for more details.
2.1 A Resource Theory
As mentioned at the beginning of this section, the AC framework views cryp-
tography as a resource theory in which a protocol is a transformation between
resources. More precisely, a protocol pi uses some resource R (the assumed re-
source) to construct some other resource S (the constructed resource) within ε,
where ε may be thought of as the error of the construction. We denote this
R
pi,ε−−→ S. (3)
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A formal definition of Eq. (3) is given below in Definition 1. Such a security state-
ment is composable, because if pi1 constructs S from R within ε1 and pi2 constructs
T from S within ε2, the composition of the two protocols, pi2pi1, constructs T from
R within ε1 + ε2, i.e.,
R
pi1,ε1−−−→ S
S
pi2,ε2−−−→ T
}
=⇒ R pi2pi1,ε1+ε2−−−−−−−→ T. (4)
Furthermore, if pi constructs S from R within ε, then when some new resource U
is accessible to the players, the construction still holds, albeit with a new error
ε′, since the computational power of U may be used by the dishonest parties to
improve their attack, i.e.,
R
pi,ε−−→ S =⇒ [R,U] pi,ε
′
−−→ [S,U]. (5)
A proof of these two statements may be found in Appendix B.
In order to formalize Eq. (3), we need to define the different elements, namely
resources R,S, a protocol pi and the measure of error yielding ε. We do this briefly
in the following, and refer to [MR11,Mau12,PR14,MR16] for more details.
Resources. In a setting with N parties, a resource is an interactive system with
N interfaces — in the three party setting, the interfaces are usually denoted A,
B, and E, for Alice, Bob, and Eve — allowing different parties to interact with
their interface, i.e., provide inputs and receive outputs. In the following sections,
resources are instantiated with quantum combs [CDP09], but the security defini-
tion is independent of the instantiation, so we defer discussing quantum combs to
Section 2.4. The only property of resources that we need in this section is that
many resources R1, . . . ,Rn taken together form a new resource, which we write
[R1, . . . ,Rn]. A party interacting at their interface of such a composed resource
has simultaneous access to the corresponding interfaces of the different Ri, and
may provide inputs or receive outputs at any of these.
An example of a system with multiple resources is given in Section 2.2, where
we model the security of one-time authentication and encryption of quantum
messages. The scheme, which is illustrated in Figure 1, involves four resources,
KEYµ, IC1,n, QC1,m,nA , and QC
1,m,n
B , drawn with square corners. In such a figure,
we always put Alice on the left, Bob on the right, and Eve below. Each party
has access to the inputs and outputs (illustrated by arrows) at their respective
sides of the drawing (at their interfaces). The exact definition of these resources
is provided in Section 3, after quantum combs have been introduced.
Converters. A converter may be thought of as local operations performed by
some party. In Figure 1 there are two converters, piq-authA and pi
q-auth
B , that corre-
spond to Alice’s and Bob’s part of the encryption and authentication protocol.
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Converters are always drawn with rounded corners. Each converter is associated
to one interface, written as subscript, which denotes the party applying the con-
verter. A protocol is then a tuple of converters, one for each honest party, e.g.,
piq-authAB = (pi
q-auth
A , pi
q-auth
B ).
Formally, a converter is defined as a function mapping a resource to another
resource. Composition of converters is defined as the composition of the corre-
sponding functions, and we usually write pi′pi instead of pi′ ◦ pi. Furthermore, con-
verters acting at different interfaces always commute, i.e., piApiB = piBpiA = piAB.
The system drawn in Figure 1 is thus a resource given by
R = piq-authAB
[
KEYµ, IC1,n,QC1,m,nA ,QC
1,m,n
B
]
.
Remark 1 (Explicit memory and computational requirements). In the spirit of
making explicit statements — as opposed to hiding parameters in O-notation or
poly-time statements — in the following we instantiate converters with systems
that are memory-less and incapable of performing any operation on their inputs,
i.e., they only forward messages between different resources and their outside
interface. This forces any memory and computation capabilities of parties to be
explicitly modeled as resources, e.g., the “quantum computer” resources QC1,m,nA
and QC1,m,nB in Figure 1, which are required for performing the encryption and
decryption operations. We note that one could equivalently “absorb” QC1,m,nA into
piq-authA and QC
1,m,n
B into pi
q-auth
B , which would result in exactly the same security
statement, but not have the computational requirements spelled out.
Pseudo-metric. The final component needed before we can formalize Eq. (3) is a
pseudo-metric,7 which is used to define the error ε. We do this in the standard way
by defining a distinguisher D to be a system that interacts with a resource, and
outputs a bit. Let D[R] be the random variable corresponding to the distinguisher’s
output when interacting with R. Then the functions
∆D(R,S) := |Pr[D[R] = 0]− Pr[D[S] = 0]|
and
dD(R,S) := sup
D∈D
∆D(R,S)
are pseudo-metrics for any set of distinguishers D. We define the error of a con-
struction using one particular set D, namely the set of distinguishers obtained
from some distinguisher D by adding or removing converters between D and the
7A pseudo-metric d(·, ·) is a function which is non-negative, symmetric, satisfies the triangle
inequality, and for any R, d(R,R) = 0. If additionally d(R, S) = 0 =⇒ R = S, then d(·, ·) is a
metric.
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measured resources. As stated in Remark 1, converters have no memory or com-
putational power, so this results in a class of “equivalent” distinguishers. Thus,
for any distinguisher D, we define the class
B(D) := {D′∣∣∃α such that Dα = D′ or D′α = D}, (6)
where ∆Dα(R,S) = ∆D(αR, αS). Abusing somewhat notation, we often write D
instead of B(D). In the following, dD(·, ·) always refers to the pseudo-metric using
the class of distinguishers generated from D as in Eq. (6).
Cryptographic Security. We now formalize the notion of (secure) resource con-
struction in the three party setting, with honest Alice and Bob and dishonest
Eve.
Definition 1 (Cryptographic security [MR11]). Let ε be a function from
distinguishers to real numbers. We say that a protocol piAB = (piA, piB) constructs
a resource S from a resource R within ε if there exists a converter simE (called a
simulator) such that for all D,
dD(piABR, simES) ≤ ε(D).
If this holds, then we write
R
pi,ε−−→ S.
When the resources R,S are clear from the context, we say that pi is ε-secure.
piABR is often referred to as the real system, and simES as the ideal one.
We emphasis that an ideal (or constructed) resource S will be used as the real
(or assumed) resource in the next construction, so the terms real and ideal are
relative.
Remark 2 (Efficiency & negligibility). Note that Definition 1 does not contain
any notion of efficiency such as poly-time, nor does it mention that the error must
be negligible. This is because concepts like efficiency and negligibility are only
defined asymptotically. As explained in Section 1.3, we define finite security in
this work. In this setting, efficient and negligible are ill-defined, and cannot be
used— nor are they needed. Asymptotic security statements may be recovered by
considering sequences of finite security statements, and taking the limit. This is
further explained in Section 2.3.
2.2 Finite Information-Theoretic Security of One-Time Quantum
Message Authentication and Encryption
To illustrate Definition 1 we model the security of one-time encryption and au-
thentication of quantum messages— taken from [Por17]— which will be used as a
Composable and Finite Computational Security of Quantum Message Trans. 13
Insecure channel IC1,n
QC1,m,nA QC
1,m,n
B
Secret key KEYµpi
q-auth
A pi
q-auth
B
ρM
σC σ˜C
ρ˜M ,⊥
keyk k
req. req.
Fig. 1. The real system for quantum authentication consists of Alice’s and Bob’s parts of the
protocol, piq-authA and pi
q-auth
B , and the following four resources: a shared secret key KEY
µ,
a (one-time use) insecure quantum channel IC1,n, and Alice’s and Bob’s local (one-time
use) quantum computers QC1,m,nA and QC
1,m,n
B . Upon receiving a message ρ
M at its outer
interface, piq-authA stores it in QC
1,m,n
A , then requests a key k from KEY
µ that is passed on to
QC1,m,nA , which performs the encryption. Finally the ciphertext σ
C received from QC1,m,nA
is input to the channel IC1,n. Upon receiving a ciphertext σ˜C from the channel IC1,n, piq-authB
stores it in QC1,m,nB , then requests a key k from KEY
µ that is passed on to QC1,m,nB , which
performs the decryption. Finally, the result of this decryption — either the message ρ˜M or
an error message ⊥— is output at the outer interface of piq-authB .
subroutine in Section 3. In this scheme, Alice wishes to send a quantum message
to Bob in such a way that an eavesdropper, Eve, can neither read it nor change
it. To do this, they share a uniform secret key, unknown to Eve, and an insecure
channel, which allows Eve to intercept the message from Alice and send one of
her own to Bob.8 These two resources are denoted KEYµ and IC1,n, and are illus-
trated in Figure 1. µ is the length of the secret key, the 1 as superscript of IC1,n
denotes that the channel is used (at most) once and n is the size (in qubits) of
the message that can be transmitted. Formal definitions of these are provided in
Section 3.2. Two more resources are needed for Alice and Bob to run their proto-
col, namely devices that can perform the encryption and decryption operations.
These are denoted QC1,m,nA and QC
1,m,n
B — the superscript 1 specifies that they
can each perform one computation, m and n specify the size of the plaintext and
ciphertext, i.e., a message of m qubits is encrypted into a ciphertext of n qubits.
Alice’s part of the protocol, piq-authA , requests QC
1,m,n
A to perform the encryption
and inputs the resulting ciphertext to the channel IC1,n. Bob’s part of the proto-
col, pi1,m,nB , uses QC
1,m,n
B to perform the decryption, and outputs the result. This
is described in more detail in the caption of Figure 1.
8Eve does not have to wait for Alice to use the insecure channel to send her own message
to Bob. She may first send him a chosen ciphertext, and only later intercept the ciphertext
generated by Alice.
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simq-authE
Secure channel SC1,m Q. Computer QC
2,m,n
E
ρM ρM ,⊥
0, 1
σC σ˜C
Fig. 2. The ideal quantum authentication system consists of a (one-time use) secure chan-
nel SC1,m, Eve’s quantum computer QC2,m,nE (that may perform one encryption and one
decryption), and the simulator σq-authE . Typically, upon receiving a notification from SC
1,m
that Alice sent a message, simq-authE will ask QC
2,m,n
E to generate a ciphertext σ
C , which
it then outputs at Eve’s interface. Upon receiving a ciphertext σ˜C at its outer interface, it
will ask QC2,m,nE to check its validity, and forward the result to SC
1,m, which then either
releases Alice’s message ρM or outputs an error ⊥— if simq-authE receives a ciphertext σ˜C
before any message ρM is input at Alice’s interface, then the ciphertext is declared invalid
and SC1,m always outputs ⊥.
We now need to design the ideal system. The goal of this protocol is to con-
struct a secure channel, i.e., one which does not leak any information about the
message to Eve— except the message length— and does not allow her to change
the message either, nor insert one of her own. In the real world, Eve may either
prevent any ciphertext from reaching Bob or jumble the ciphertext resulting in
Bob receiving garbage (and outputting an error), so this must also be reflected in
the ideal world. Thus, the ideal resource constructed— the secure channel SC1,m
illustrated in Figure 2— notifies Eve when a message is input at Alice’s interface
(denoted by the dashed arrow),9 and waits for a bit at Eve’s interface that tells
it whether to output the original message at Bob’s interface or an error message
⊥.10 The superscript 1 specifies that this channel may be used once and m denotes
the size of the message it transmits.
If such a protocol is used as a subroutine in a larger context, Eve could use
the computational power of Alice and Bob to her advantage, e.g., if she needs the
encryption or decryption operations to be applied to some quantum state, she
can provide this state to the honest players and intercept their output. Such a
construction thus provides some computation power to Eve, namely, it also con-
9Since the construction is parameterized by the message length m, there is no need to leak
this information at Eve’s interface. In a construction where m is unknown to Eve, a secure
channel may additionally leak (an upper bound on) the message size to Eve.
10If Eve does not provide this bit, the channel does not output anything.
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structs a resource QC2,m,nE which can perform one encryption and one decryption
for a randomly chosen key.11,12
The security definition, Definition 1, requires there to exist a simulator such
that the real and ideal worlds are indistinguishable. The exact simulator simq-authE
will depend on the protocol analyzed, but — as described in more detail in the
caption of Figure 2 — it will typically ask QC2,m,nE to generate a ciphertext to
simulate that of Alice, then ask QC2,m,nE to perform a decryption to check the
validity of the ciphertext received from Eve. The result of this decryption will
decide whether Alice’s message is released to Bob or not.
For a specific protocol piq-authAB , a security proof in the information-theoretic
setting consists in showing that this is secure for all distinguishers, i.e., one must
find a simq-authE and some constant function ε such that the real and ideal systems
(Figure 1 and 2) are ε-close, e.g., Lemma 1 here below.
Lemma 1. [Por17] Let piq-authAB be any member of a family of protocols that en-
crypt the message using (weak) purity testing codes [BCG+02, Por17] from a set
C of size log |C| = ν with error ε ∈ R. Then there exists a simq-authE such that for
any D,
dD
(
piq-authAB
[
KEYν+m+n, IC1,n,QC1,m,nA ,QC
1,m,n
B
]
, simq-authE
[
SC1,m,QC2,m,nE
])
≤ max{2m−n, ε},
i.e.,[
KEYν+2m+n, IC1,n,QC1,m,nA ,QC
1,m,n
B
]
piq-authAB ,max{2m−n,ε}−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
[
SC1,m,QC2,m,nE
]
.
Note that since we only consider constant functions ε in information-theoretic
security, we write ε both for the function and the value ε(D) ∈ R.
Plugging in a specific instantiation of a (weak) purity testing code with ν = 3n
and ε = 2m−n— the unitary 2-design construction [Por17]— one then obtains the
following.
Corollary 1. [Por17] Let piq-authAB be the unitary 2-design construction, then[
KEYm+4n, IC1,n,QC1,m,nA ,QC
1,m,n
B
]
piq-authAB ,2
m−n
−−−−−−−−→
[
SC1,m,QC2,m,nE
]
.
11For some protocols this may be providing Eve with unnecessary power, e.g., if the ciphertext
looks like a full mixed state, it may be sufficient for QC2,m,nE to generate a purification of such a
state and not need the ability to perform an encryption.
12In an asymptotic setting one would not care about this, since the protocol is efficient this
would vanish in some poly-time statement. But in a finite setting where we keep track of all
computation, one should model this explicitly. See also Remark 1.
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Insecure channel IC1,n
QC1,m,nA QC
1,m,n
B
Secret key PRGr,µpi
q-auth
A pi
q-auth
B
ρM
σC σ˜C
ρ˜M ,⊥
keyk k
req. req. C
Fig. 3. The real system for quantum authentication with a PRG. It is identical to Figure 1,
except for the uniform key resource KEYµ which has been replaced by a pseudo-random
key resource PRGr,µ which produces a key of length µ from a uniform seed of length r. The
system within the dashed line is labeled C, and is relevant in the reduction.
One may easily obtain an asymptotic security statement from Corollary 1 by
taking a sequence of constructions parameterized by, e.g., r = n−m, and taking
the limit as r →∞.
2.3 Finite Computational Security of One-Time Quantum Message
Authentication and Encryption
In Section 2.2 we gave an example of a construction that has information-the-
oretic security: the distance between the real and ideal systems is bounded for
every distinguisher, i.e., ε is a constant function. If one considers computational
security, then one is not interested in security in all contexts, but only when the
distinguisher cannot solve problems considered to be “hard”. A security proof is
then a reduction to one of these hard problems. In the case of finite security we
consider reductions to finite problems.
To illustrate this we will model a computational version of the quantum au-
thentication and encryption protocol from Section 2.2. In fact, we will analyze
exactly the same protocol, but just replace the uniform key resource KEYµ with
pseudo-random key resource PRGr,µ, where r is the length of the (uniform) seed of
the pseudo-random generator (PRG)— assumed to be hard-coded in the PRG—
and µ is the length of the key it produces. The real world now looks exactly like
Figure 1, except for the swap of the key for a PRG, which we have drawn in
Figure 3.
The ideal world is identical to Figure 2 as our goal is still to construct the
same ideal channel resource SC1,m. What changes is the error function ε which
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will be small for some distinguishers and large for others. More precisely, we show
that if D can distinguish the real from the ideal systems, then there exists an
(explicit) distinguisher D′ that can distinguish PRGr,µ from KEYµ.
Lemma 2. Let piq-authAB , sim
q-auth
E and ε be such that for any D,
dD
(
piq-authAB
[
KEYµ, IC1,n,QC1,m,nA ,QC
1,m,n
B
]
, simq-authE
[
SC1,m,QC2,m,nE
])
≤ ε(D).
Then for any D we have
dD
(
piq-authAB
[
PRGr,µ, IC1,n,QC1,m,nA ,QC
1,m,n
B
]
, simq-authE
[
SC1,m,QC2,m,nE
])
≤ dDC(PRGr,µ,KEYµ) + ε(D), (7)
where C is the system drawn in dashed lines in Figure 3, and DC is a distinguisher
obtained by composing D and C in the obvious way.
Proof. Follows from the triangle inequality and dD(CR,CS) ≤ dDC(R,S).
Remark 3. The security statement in Eq. (7) is a reduction. It states that if it
is hard to distinguish PRGr,µ from KEYµ, then the scheme must be secure. Note
that this is a finite reduction. We do not need to care whether PRGr,µ and KEYµ
are asymptotically indistinguishable,13 but whether the finite instantiation for
some fixed r and µ is indistinguishable — which is the relevant statement for an
implementation. Unlike the asymptotic case, where one does not need to define
the reduction system C or error ε precisely but just make a statement about their
limit, here, the exact reduction C and parameter ε are crucial for the statement
to be complete.
Suppose now that one has a bound ε′ on the distinguishability of the PRG
from a uniform key. Then one may plug this into Lemma 2 to get a (direct)
security statement for the construction.14
Corollary 2. Let ε′ be a function such that for all D, dD(PRGr,µ,KEYµ) ≤ ε′(D).
Then [
PRGr,µ, IC1,n,QC1,m,nA ,QC
1,m,n
B
]
piq-authAB ,ε(·)+ε′(·C)−−−−−−−−−−−→
[
SC1,m,QC2,m,nE
]
, (8)
where ε′(·C) is the function D 7→ ε′(DC).
13Asymptotic indistinguishability means that one sets µ = p(r) for some polynomial p and
takes the limit as r →∞.
14Corollary 2 is a special case of the composition theorem: security of the encryption scheme
with a PRG follows the security of the PRG and the security of the encryption scheme.
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Asymptotic security. Eqs. (7) and (8) are finite security statements for the pro-
tocol piq-authAB . Asymptotic statements may be obtained as a corollary if one takes
sequences of finite statements and takes the limit. The (generic) construction pre-
sented so far has multiple parameters, namely ε,m, n, r, µ. To define a sequence
and take the limit, one has to simplify this. We do so by plugging in specific
constructions. Suppose that we have a PRG with µ = p(r) for some polynomial
p, and we take the unitary 2-design construction from Corollary 1. Then Eq. (7)
becomes
dD
m,r
(
piq-authAB R
m,r, simq-authE S
m,r
)
≤ dDm,rCm,r
(
PRGr,p(r),KEYp(r)
)
+ 2m−p(r),
where we have set Rm,r :=
[
PRGr,p(r), IC1,p(r),QC
1,m,p(r)
A ,QC
1,m,p(r)
B
]
and Sm,r :=[
SC1,m,QC
2,m,p(r)
E
]
, and parameterized D and C by m and r for consistency. Let
us view m as fixed and take sequences with r ∈ N.15
Since Cm,r is poly-time—Cm,r basically runs the protocol, which is efficient—
the error 2m−p(r) is negligible and we believe that dD˜m,r
(
PRGr,p(r),KEYp(r)
)
is
negligible for any poly-time D˜m,r (in particular for D˜m,r = Dm,rCm,r), then we
can recover the standard asymptotic statement from Eq. (2.3). More precisely, it
then follows that for any poly-time Dm,r,
∆D
m,r
(
piq-authAB R
m,r, simq-authE S
m,r
)
≤ εm,r (9)
for some negligible εm,r.
2.4 Instantiating AC
We consider sequential scheduling in this work, i.e., a system receives a message,
then produces an output, receives another input, generates another output, etc.
Here, the messages sent and received may be quantum, but the party to whom a
message is sent is given by classical information.16
Quantum Combs. Let HA be the input Hilbert space of a system R, HB be the
output Hilbert space and HM be some internal memory. R is fully defined by a
completely positive, trace-preserving (CPTP) map
E : L(HAM )→ L(HBM ), (10)
15One may alternatively set m = q(r) for some appropriate polynomial q.
16An alternative model of systems that allows quantum scheduling — messages can be in a
superposition of sent and not sent, or a superposition of sent to player A and sent to player B— is
the Causal Boxes model [PMM+17], which can additionally capture relativistic causal constraints
[VPdR17]. For the current work however, (classical) sequential scheduling is sufficient, so we use
the simpler quantum combs [CDP09].
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which specifies what output is produced and how the internal memory is updated
as a function of the input and current internal memory. Each time an input
ρ ∈ L(HA) is received (which may be part of a larger entangled system), the map
E is applied, and the output σ ∈ L(HB) is sent to the appropriate party.
This is however a redundant description of a system, since different maps E
may produce exactly the same output behavior. The works on quantum combs
[GW07,Gut12,CDP09,Har11,Har12,Har15] define such a system for n inputs as
a CPTP map
Φn : L(H⊗nA )→ L(H⊗nB ) (11)
subject to a causality constraint that enforces that an output in position i can only
depend on inputs in positions ≤ i. Such a system may have various descriptions,
e.g., as the (unique) Choi matrix corresponding to the map Φn, as a map E as in
Eq. (10), or as pseudo-code that describes the behavior of the system.
In this work we often use pseudo-code to describe resources. Though each time
it corresponds to a specific quantum comb that is uniquely defined by a map as
in Eq. (11).
Resources as Combs. As stated at the beginning of Section 2.4, in our model
the sender and receiver of messages are given by classical information. Formally,
this means the input and output Hilbert space of a resource has the form HA =⊕
iHAi , and the first operation of a resource is a projection on the different
subspaces Ai to determine this classical information. For example, the different i
correspond to the different interfaces of a resource or different ports at an interface.
When two resources R and S with input (or output) spaces HA and HB ac-
cessible in parallel, the resulting resource T = [R, S] is a new quantum comb with
input (respectively, output) space given by HA⊕HB, and the initial measurement
determines which sub-resource (R or S) receives and processes the input. Similarly,
plugging a converter α into a resource R, results in a new resource U = αR, whose
corresponding quantum comb is computed from the comb of R and the pairs of
ports connected by α.
More generally, the works on quantum combs [GW07, Gut12, CDP09, Har11,
Har12,Har15] show how such objects may be composed to form networks— which
are again objects of the same type, namely quantum combs— and how one defines
a (distinguisher-based) pseudo-metric on combs. We refer to them for more details.
3 Constructing Quantum Cryptographic Channels
In Section 3.1 and Section 3.2 we formalize the resources used in our construc-
tions. Then, starting from the insecure quantum channel IC, a shared secret key
KEY and local pseudo random function PRF, we show how to construct (1) the
ordered secure quantum channel OSC in Section 3.3 and (2) the Pauli-malleable
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confidential quantum channel PMCC in Section 3.4. A construction of the ordered
secure quantum channel OSC from one which is secure but not ordered (SC) is
also presented in Appendix D.
3.1 Key Resources
A (shared) secret key resource corresponds to a system that provides a key k to
the honest players, but nothing to the adversary.
Definition 2 (Symmetric (Classical) Key KEY). The resource KEY is asso-
ciated with a probability distribution PK for (classical) key space K. A key k ∈ K
is drawn according to PK and stored in the resource.
– Interface A: On input getKey, k is output at interface A.
– Interface B: On input getKey, k is output at interface B.
– Interface E: Inactive.
In the computational setting, instead of sharing a long key, players often share
a short key which is used as seed in a local key expansion scheme. On such key
expansion scheme which we use in this work is a so-called pseudo random function.
It is essentially a family of functions which looks random.
Definition 3 (Pseudo Random Function PRFr,ν,µ). The resource PRFr,ν,µ is
associated to a family of functions {fk : {0, 1}ν → {0, 1}µ|k ∈ {0, 1}r} and has an
internal variable seed of length r. The functions in the family have input length
ν and output length µ. The resource is local to one party only. Let this party’s
interface be labeled X.
– Interface X:
• On input seed(s), set variable seed to s.
• On input input(x), output fseed(x) at interface X.
The above definition of a PRF does not contain any criterion for what it means
to “look random”. This is defined in a second step as distinguishability from a
uniform random function.
Definition 4 (Uniform Random Function URFν,µ). The resource URFν,µ
picks a function f from all functions {0, 1}ν → {0, 1}µ uniformly at random.
– Interface A: On input input(x), output f(x) at interface A.
– Interface B: On input input(x), output f(x) at interface B.
– Interface E: Inactive.
Let piPRF be the trivial protocol which uses a (short) shared key (from a KEY
resource) and plugs it as seed in a PRF resource, and let εPRF(D) be the advantage
the distinguisher D has in distinguishing such a construction from a URF, i.e., for
all D
dD(piPRF[KEYr,PRFr,ν,µA ,PRF
r,ν,µ
B ],URF
ν,µ) ≤ PRF(D),
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where dD(·, ·) is the distinguisher pseudo-metric as defined in Section 2.1. In terms
of AC construction, this means that[
KEYr,PRFr,ν,µA ,PRF
r,ν,µ
B
] piPRF,PRF−−−−−−→ URFν,µ. (12)
Concrete constructions of PRFs proven secure in the presence of quantum adver-
saries may be found in [Zha12].
3.2 Channel resources
We consider three-party channels in this work: the sending party Alice has access
to interface A, the receiving party Bob to interface B, and the adversary Eve to
interface E. We model all our channels in the following way: upon an input at
interface A, an output is generated at interface E, while upon an input at interface
E, an output is generated at interface B. Moreover, we consider multi-message
channels parameterized by `, that is, Alice and Eve can provide at most ` inputs
at their respective interfaces. These inputs can be entangled with each other. We
model quantum channels, therefore inputs and outputs to and from the channels’
interfaces are quantum systems. The channels are also parameterized by m, the
size of each message in qubits.
In the following we introduce the formal description of the channels considered
in this work by specifying the behavior they assume upon inputs at their A and
E interfaces. First, we consider the weakest possible channel, that is, the insecure
one, which gives full control to the adversary Eve. Eve receives all the message
that Alice inputs to the channel. Bob receives all the messages that Eve inputs to
the channel.
Definition 5 (Insecure Quantum Channel IC`,m).
– Interface A: On receiving an input system in some state ρ, perform an iden-
tity map and output the same system at interface E.
– Interface E: On receiving an input system in some state ρ′, perform an iden-
tity map and output the same system at interface B.
Interface A and E will receive at most ` inputs and ignore the rest. The quantum
systems input at interface A and E and output at interface B have length m in
qubits.
Next, we enhance the insecure channel by providing some form of confiden-
tiality on the states input by Alice. More precisely, we allow Eve to only get a
notification that a new message has arrived in interface A, but still, Eve will retain
the capability to modify each input ρAi (held in register Ai).
Here, one may consider different ways in which Eve is allowed to modify the
messages. The first channel we consider grants Eve the power to insert fully mixed
states on the channel, as well as performing Pauli operators (bit flips and phase
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flips) on Alice’s message and decide when each message gets delivered. This is
modeled by keeping registers Ai for each new input at interface A, and allowing
Eve to input indices specifying which register should be modified and output
at interface B. Along with the index, Eve also inputs a string of length 2m,
indicating on which qubits of the message to apply Pauli operators. If Eve wants
a fully mixed state to be output at Bob’s, she inputs ⊥ at her interface and the
channel generates the corresponding state.
Definition 6 (Pauli-Malleable Confidential Quantum Channel PMCC`,m).
The channel keeps registers A1, A2, . . . , A`, initially set to ⊥.
– Interface A: Upon receiving the i-th input in some state ρ, this system is
stored in register Ai, and newMsg is output at interface E.
– Interface E:
• On input (j, k) ∈ [l]×{0, 1}2m, output system in state PkρAjPk at interface
B, where ρAj is the state of the system held in register Aj and Pk is the
Pauli operator defined by the string k— see Appendix A. If the tuple is
invalid or ρAj is ⊥, the input is considered as ⊥. After the output, the
state in register Aj becomes ⊥.
• On input ⊥, output a fully mixed stated 12m I2m at interface B.
Interface A and E will receive at most ` inputs and ignore the rest. The quantum
systems input at interface A and output at interface B always have length m in
qubits.
Another type of confidential channel we consider is obtained by removing Eve’s
capability to modify Alice’s messages, while giving her the ability to inject any
system (instead of only systems in the fully mixed state).
Definition 7 (Non-Malleable Confidential Quantum Channel NMCC`,m).
The channel keeps registers A1, A2, . . . , A`, initially set to ⊥.
– Interface A: Upon receiving the i-th input in some state ρ, this system is
stored in register Ai, and newMsg is output at interface E.
– Interface E:
• On receiving an input system in some state ρ′, perform an identity map
and output the same system at interface B.
• On input index j ∈ [`], output the system in state ρAj held in register Aj
at interface B. After the output, the state of register Aj becomes ⊥.
Interface A and E will receive at most ` inputs and ignore the rest. The quantum
systems input at interface A and output at interface B always have length m in
qubits.
The next property to consider is authenticity: recall that in the quantum set-
ting, authenticity implies confidentiality, thus it does not make sense to consider
a “non-confidential authentic channel”, since a state cannot be cloned to be given
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to both Bob and Eve. An authentic channel will automatically also be a confiden-
tial one [BCG+02]. Therefore, as a next channel we directly consider the secure
one— by secure we mean both authentic and confidential. Eve only knows a new
message has arrived but cannot read, modify, nor inject messages. Eve still has
the power to block and reorder Alice’s message.
Definition 8 (Secure Quantum Channel SC`,m). The channel keeps registers
A1, A2, . . . , A`, initially set to ⊥.
– Interface A: Upon receiving the i-th input in some state ρ, this system is
stored in register Ai, and newMsg is output at interface E.
– Interface E: On input index j ∈ [`], output the system in state ρAj held in
register Aj at interface B. After the output, the state in register Aj becomes
⊥.
Interface A and E will receive at most ` inputs and ignore the rest. The quantum
systems input at interface A and output at interface B always have length m in
qubits.
Finally, we consider an even stronger version of the secure channel which
preserves the order of the transmitted messages. In particular, the adversary now
only retains the power to delete messages, but cannot change the order in which
they are transmitted. This is enforced by replacing the capability to input indices
by the ability of only inputting either send or skip.
Definition 9 (Ordered Secure Quantum Channel OSC`,m). The channel
keeps registers A1, A2, . . . , A`, initially set to ⊥.
– Interface A: Upon receiving the i-th input in some state ρ, this system is
stored in register Ai, and newMsg is output at interface E.
– Interface E: On i-th input send or skip: If the input is send, output the system
in state ρAi held in register Ai at interface B. If the input is skip, then output
⊥ at interface B. After the output, the state in register Ai becomes ⊥.
Interface A and E will receive at most ` inputs and ignore the rest. The quantum
systems input at interface A and output at interface B always have length m in
qubits.
3.3 Constructing an Ordered Secure Quantum Channel
As stated in Lemma 1 from Section 2.2, there is a construction of one time secure
quantum channel from one time insecure quantum channel resource and a uniform
key resource within q-auth, i.e.[
IC1,n,KEYµ,QC1,m,nA ,QC
1,m,n
B
]
piq-authAB ,
q-auth
−−−−−−−−−→
[
SC1,m,QC2,m,nE
]
.
Here, IC, SC and KEY are channel and key resources, as defined above. QCA/B/E
denote a resource that does quantum computation for Alice, Bob or Eve, and
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piA piB QCA QCB
1. piA: Alice inputs a message ρ
A and requests her computer to encrypt ρA.
2. QCA: On the i-th input ρ
A, the computer requests (through piA) ki = input(i) from
URF, computes ciphertext σC = encq-authki (ρ
A), appends index |i〉〈i| on the ciphertext and
outputs ψCT = σC ⊗ |i〉〈i|T to Alice.
3. piA: Alice sends ciphertext ψ
CT to Bob through insecure quantum channel IC.
4. piB : Bob receives ciphertext ψ˜
C˜T˜ and requests his computer to decrypt ψ˜C˜T˜ .
5. QCB : On the i-th input ψ˜
C˜T˜ , the computer takes first n qubits as σ˜C , measures last log `
qubits and obtains the measurement result ı˜. If ı˜ = i, the computer requests (through
piB) ki = input(i) from resource URF, computes plaintext ρ˜ = dec
q-auth
ki
(σ˜). If it decrypts
successfully, the computer outputs ρ˜ to Bob. If ı˜ 6= i or it does not decrypt successfully,
the computer outputs ⊥ to Bob.
6. piB : Bob outputs the decrypted message ρ˜
B .
Fig. 4. Converters and computing resources to construct OSC`,m from IC`,n+log `.
QC`,m,n+log `A and QC
`,m,n+log `
B will be queried ` times. The plaintext has length m and
the ciphertext has length n+ log `. URFlog `,µ has input length log ` and output length µ.
allows them to perform encryption and decryption operations (we informally re-
fer to such resources as quantum computers in the following). These appear in
the construction statement since for finite security one makes all computational
operations explicit— see Section 2 for more details.
We denote the encoding and decoding CPTP maps in this construction by
encq-auth : K × L(HA) → L(HC) and decq-auth : K × L(HC˜) → L(HB ⊕ |⊥〉〈⊥|).
We also denote by E the CPTP map that always discards the state and replaces it
with error state |⊥〉〈⊥|. In this section, we build on top of these encoding and de-
coding maps to construct a multi-message ordered secure quantum channel from a
multi-message insecure quantum channel, with a shared uniform random function
resource URFlog `,µ. The real system is drawn in Figure 5 and the components are
described in Figure 4. The ideal system one wishes to build is depicted in Figure 6.
Theorem 1. Let piAB = (piA, piB),QC
`,m,n+log `
A ,QC
`,m,n+log `
B and URF
log `,µdenote
converters and computing resources as described in Figure 4, corresponding to Al-
ice and Bob both applying the following CPTP maps with increasing index i:
ΛA→CTi (·) = encq-authki (·)⊗ |i〉〈i|
T
ΛC˜T˜→Bi (·) = decq-authki
(
(IC˜ ⊗ 〈i|T˜ )(·)(IC˜ ⊗ |i〉T˜ )
)
+ E
(
P¯ T˜i (·)P¯ T˜i )
)
,
where P¯i = I−|i〉〈i|, and ki is the output of URFlog `,µ with input i. Let QC2`,m,n+log `E
be the computing resource of Eve capable of doing ` encryption operations and `
decryption operations. Let q-auth be the upper bound on the distinguishing advan-
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IC
QCA QCB
URF
piA piB
ρA
ψCT ψ˜C˜T˜
ρ˜B/⊥
ki ki
i i
ρA, ki
ψCT
ψ˜C˜T˜ , ki
ρ˜B/⊥
Fig. 5. The real system consisting of the shared resources IC`,n+log ` and URFlog `,µ, Alice
and Bob’s computing resources QC`,m,n+log `A QC
`,m,n+log `
B , and the protocol converters piA
and piB .
simE
OSC QCE
QCq-authi
. . .
ρAi ρAi/⊥
ψC ψ˜C
newMsg skip/send ψ˜
CψCnewMsg skip/send
Fig. 6. The ideal system consisting of OSC`,m,QC2`,m,n+log `E and simE . QC
2`,m,n+log `
E
makes use of ` instances of QCq-auth internally, while simE only receives and forwards mes-
sages and does no computation.
tage of the one time secure quantum channel construction. Then,[
IC`,n+log `,URFlog `,µ,QC`,m,n+log`A ,QC
`,m,n+log`
B
]
piAB ,`
q-auth
−−−−−−−−→
[
OSC`,m,QC2`,m,n+log `E
]
.
Proof. In order to prove the statement, we need to find a simulator simE and
describe what Eve’s quantum computer QC2`,m,n+log `E does such that real system,
as illustrated in Figure 5 and the ideal system, as illustrated in Figure 6 are
indistinguishable within `q-auth, where q-auth is the constant upper bound on the
error of the one message authentication scheme.
The simulator simE works as following. On input newMsg from the ideal re-
source OSC`,m, it requests QC2`,m,n+log `E to provide a quantum state ψ and outputs
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ψ at interface E. On input ψ˜ at interface E, it requests QC2`,m,n+log `E to provide
send or skip signal. The signal is then forwarded to ideal channel OSC`,m.
Eve’s computing resource QC2`,m,n+log `E will use QC
2,m,n
E of the one time se-
cure quantum channel construction as a subroutine. We refer to this subroutine
computer resource as QCq-auth. QC2`,m,n+log `E works as following,
– On the i-th input newMsg, the computer instantiates a new QCq-authi , sends
newMsg to QCq-authi . After getting the ciphertext σ from QC
q-auth
i , the com-
puter appends index i to σ and output ψ = σ⊗ |i〉〈i| to simE . After output ψ,
the computer updates internal counter nextIndex = i.
– On input ψ˜, the computer takes the first n qubits as ciphertext σ˜, measures
the last log ` qubits and obtains the measurement result ı˜. If nextIndex 6= ı˜,
the computer outputs skip to simE . If nextIndex = ı˜, the computer forwards
ciphertext σ˜ to QCq-authı˜ . If QC
q-auth
ı˜ outputs acc, the computer outputs send
to simE . If QC
q-auth
ı˜ outputs rej, the computer outputs skip to simE .
We define R` := piAB
[
IC`,n+log `,URFlog `,µ,QC`,m,n+log `A ,QC
`,m,n+log `
B
]
and S` :=
simE
[
OSC`,m,QC2`,m,n+log `E
]
. Note that we can consider the channel of ` messages
as ` different 1 message channels with an obvious converter α that directs the
message according to its tag into the corresponding channel, i.e., IC`,n+log ` ≡
α
[
IC1,n1 , IC
1,n
2 , . . . , IC
1,n
`
]
. Similarly URFlog `,µ can be consider as ` different KEYµ
resources and channel OSC`,m and quantum computers QC`,m,n+log `A , QC
`,m,n+log `
B ,
QC2`,m,n+log `E can all be considered as ` different 1 message resources with the
same converter α. We further define Ri := pi
q-auth
AB
[
IC1,ni ,KEY
µ
i ,QC
1,m,n
Ai
,QC1,m,nBi
]
and Si = sim
q-auth
[
OSC1,mi ,QC
2,m,n
Ei
]
. We can see that R` ≡ α[R1,R2, . . . ,R`] and
S` ≡ α[S1,S2, . . . ,S`] since for each message the protocol piAB and simE works
exactly the same as piq-authAB and sim
q-auth in the one time secure quantum channel
construction. For any distinguisher D,
∆D
(
R`, S`
)
= ∆Dα([R1,R2, . . . ,R`], [S1, S2, . . . ,S`])
≤
∑`
i=1
∆Dα([S1, . . . ,Si−1,Ri,Ri+1, . . . ,R`],
[S1, . . . ,Si−1,Si,Ri+1, . . . ,R`])
≤
∑`
i=1
∆DαCi(Ri, Si)
≤
∑`
i=1
q-auth(DαCi) ≤ `q-auth.
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This analysis follows from a standard hybrid argument. For a distinguisher D
to distinguish in the multi-message case, the new distinguishers DαCi, attached by
a converter α and Ci = [S1, . . . ,Si−1, ·,Ri+1, . . . ,R`], has to distinguish in one of
the one message cases. The final inequality follows from the information-theoretic
bound in the one message case, where we have used q-auth both for the function
and its upper bound.
Remark. Theorem 1 is meaningful only if the protocol is also correct, i.e., if the
distinguisher always puts back the same ciphertext on the insecure channel in
the right order, then Bob always successfully decrypts. This follows trivially from
the correctness of the underlying quantum authentication protocol, so we omit a
formal discussion of it.
Suppose now that one has a PRF resource and a bound PRF satisfying Eq. (12),
that is, indistinguishable from URF within PRF, the following corollary follows
trivially from the composition theorem Theorem 5 in Appendix B.
Corollary 3.[
IC`,n+log `,KEYr,PRFr,log `,µA ,PRF
r,log `,µ
B ,QC
`,m,n+log`
A ,QC
`,m,n+log`
B
]
pi′AB ,−−−→
[
OSC`,m,QC2`,m,n+log `E
]
,
where pi′AB = (piAB, pi
PRF), (D) = PRF(DC)+`q-auth and C is the system including
piAB, IC
`,n+log `, QC`,m,n+log`A , QC
`,m,n+log`
B .
3.4 Constructing a Pauli-Malleable Confidential Quantum Channel
In this section, we construct a Pauli-malleable confidential quantum channel
PMCC`,m from an insecure quantum channel IC`,m+ν . In the Pauli-malleable confi-
dential channel, the adversary can only get a notification of a new message arriving
but has no access to the message. The adversary has the ability to block, reorder
and modify the message via Pauli operators (bit flip and phase flip), as well as
ask the channel to output a fully mixed state at Bob’s interface, as defined in
Definition 6.
Now we present the protocol in the multi-message case, described in Figure 7.
In the protocol, Alice’s computer will generate a new random string x of length ν
for each message different from previous random strings and input it to URFν,2m,
a key k is returned by URFν,2m , the Pauli-operator Pk is applied to the message
and x is appended to the ciphertext. Bob’s computer will do the measurement on
the last ν qubits to get x˜, which is input to URFν,2m, from which k˜ is obtained
and finally the Pauli operator Pk˜ is applied to the ciphertext. The real system is
drawn in Figure 8, and the ideal system we construct is illustrated in Figure 9.
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piA piB QCA QCB
1. piA: Alice inputs a message ρ
Ai and requests her computer to encrypt it.
2. QCA: On input ρ
Ai , it generates a new random string x of length ν different from pre-
viously generated random strings, requests (through piA) k = input(x) from URF. Then
the computer applies Pauli operator Pk on the state ρ
Ai and gets σC = Pkρ
AiPk. The
computer appends |x〉〈x|T to σC and outputs ψCT = σC ⊗ |x〉〈x|T to Alice.
3. piA: Alice sends ψ
CT to Bob through secure quantum channel IC`,m+ν .
4. piB : Bob receives ψ˜
C˜T˜ and requests his computer to decrypt it.
5. QCB : On input ψ˜
C˜T˜ , the computer takes the first m qubits as σ˜C˜ . Then the computer
measures the last ν qubits and get measurement result x˜. Then the computer requests
(through piB) k˜ = input(x˜) from URF. Then the computer applies Pauli operator Pk˜ on
the state σ˜C˜ . Then the computer outputs ρ˜B = Pk˜σ˜Pk˜ to Bob.
6. piB : Bob outputs the decrypted message ρ˜
B .
Fig. 7. Converters and computer resources to construct PMCC`,m from IC`,m+ν . QC`,m,m+νA
and QC`,m,m+νB will be queried ` times. The plaintext has length m and ciphertext has length
m+ ν. URFν,2m has input length ν and output length 2m.
Theorem 2. Let piAB = (piA, piB),QC
`,m,m+ν
A and QC
`,m,m+ν
B denote converters
and computing resources, described in Figure 7, corresponding to Alice and Bob
applying the following CPTP maps,
ΛAi→CT (·) = 1
2ν
∑
x
Pkx(·)Pkx ⊗ |x〉〈x|T
ΛC˜T˜→B(·) =
∑
x
(Pkx ⊗ 〈x|T˜ )(·)(Pkx ⊗ |x〉T˜ ),
where kx is the output of URF
ν,2m with input x. Let QC2`,m,m+νE be the comput-
ing resource of Eve capable of doing ` encryption operations and ` decryption
operations. Then piAB constructs a Pauli-malleable confidential quantum channel
PMCC`,m from an insecure quantum channel resource IC`,m+ν , a shared uniform
random function resource URFν,2m within `2 · 2−ν , i.e.,[
IC`,m+ν ,URFν,2m,QC`,m,m+νA ,QC
`,m,m+ν
B
]
piAB ,`
22−ν−−−−−−−→
[
PMCC`,m,QC2`,m,m+νE
]
.
In Appendix C we analyze the one-message case, which is then used in the
following proof.
Proof. We present the simulator simE and QC
2`,m,m+ν
E in the multi-message case
and prove that R` cannot be distinguished from S` with significant advantage for
any distinguisher D, where we define the real system illustrated in Figure 8 as
R` := piAB
[
IC`,m+ν ,URFν,2m,QC`,m,m+νA ,QC
`,m,m+ν
B
]
, and the ideal system drawn
in Figure 9 is S` := simE
[
PMCC`,m,QC2`,m,m+νE
]
.
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IC
QCA QCB
URF
piA piB
ρAi
ψCT ψ˜C˜T˜
ρ˜B
k k˜
x x˜
ρAi , k
ψCT
ψ˜C˜T˜ , k˜
ρ˜B
Fig. 8. The real system consisting of shared resources IC`,m+ν and URFν,2m, Alice and Bob’s
computing resources QC`,m,m+νA and QC
`,m,m+ν
B , and the protocol converters piA and piB .
simE
PMCC QCE
QCq-otpi
. . .P
ρAi
(j, k)/⊥
1
2m
I2m
Pkρ
AjPk/
ψC ψ˜C
newMsg ψ˜CψCnewMsg (j, k)/⊥
Fig. 9. The ideal system consisting of PMCC`,m,QC2`,m,m+νE and simE . QC
2`,m,m+ν
E makes
use of ` instances of QCq-otp internally while simE only receives and forwards messages and
does no computation.
The simulator simE works exactly the same as the one message case analyzed
in Appendix C. On input newMsg from the ideal resource PMCC`,m, it requests
QC2`,m,m+νE to provide a quantum state ψ and outputs ψ at interface E. On input
ψ˜ at interface E, it requests QC2`,m,m+νE to provide a tuple (i, k) (or ⊥). The tuple
(or ⊥) is then forwarded to ideal channel PMCC`,m. Eve’s computing resource
QC2`,m,m+νE will use the computing resource QC
q-otp of the one message Pauli-
malleable confidential quantum channel construction as a subroutine. QC2`,m,m+νE
works as following.
– On the i-th input newMsg from simE , the computer instantiates a new QC
q-otp
i
instance with index i and sends newMsg to QCq-otpi . After getting the state
σ from QCq-otpi , the computer generates a random x of length ν, stores tuple
(i, x) internally, appends x to state σ and outputs ψ = σ ⊗ |x〉〈x| to simE .
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– On input ψ˜ from interface E, the computer takes the first m qubits of ψ˜ as
state σ˜, measures the last ν qubits of ψ˜ and obtains the measurement result
x˜. If x˜ is not stored internally, the computer outputs ⊥ to simE . If x˜ is store
internally, the computer retrieves tuple (˜ı, x˜), then it sends state σ˜ to QCq-otpı˜ .
After getting output k˜ (or ⊥) from QCq-otpı˜ , the computer sends tuple (˜ı, k˜)
(or ⊥) to simE .
Let us consider R
`
:= piAB
[
IC
`,m+ν
,URFν,2m,QC`,m,m+νA ,QC
`,m,m+ν
B
]
and S
`
:=
simE
[
PMCC
`,m
,QC2`,m,m+νE
]
where the channels with overline IC and PMCC will
reject any input from interface A if it contains the same tag x as previous input
from interface E. Therefore, R
`
and R`, S
`
and S` are equivalent to any distin-
guisher up to the point that the distinguisher successfully guesses the string x
that is randomly chosen by Alice’s computer. In this case, in the real world the
distinguisher inputs σ ⊗ |x〉〈x| at interface E, state σ is flipped by some Pauli
operator and is output at interface B. The distinguisher then forwards the output
from interface B to interface A. Alice’s computer happens to choose the same x
for this input, thus flips the state back with the same Pauli operator and outputs
same message σ ⊗ |x〉〈x| at interface E. While in the ideal world, a fully mixed
state with an appended tag will be output at interface E.
Let x1, x2, . . . , x` be the random string of length ν randomly chosen by Alice,
the probability that distinguisher guesses one successfully in ` times is
1− (1− `
2ν
)` ≤ `
2
2ν
.
Therefore, for any distinguisher D, we have
dD
(
R`, S`
)
≤ dD
(
R
`
, S
`
)
+
`2
2ν
. (13)
Following from a standard hybrid argument, if a distinguisher D can distin-
guish R
`
and S
`
, it can be used to construct a distinguisher in the one mes-
sage scenario, distinguishing R
1
= piAB
[
IC
1,m
,KEY2m,QC1,m,mA ,QC
1,m,m
B
]
from
S
1
= simq-otp
[
PMCC
1,m
,QCq-otp
]
. Yet from Lemma 7 we know that R
1
and S
1
are equivalent. Therefore for any distinguisher D, dD
(
R
`
,S
`
)
= 0.
Overall, we have proved that for any distinguisher D,
dD
(
R`,S`
)
≤ `
2
2ν
,
which concludes the construction proof.
Remark. The protocol given in Theorem 2 also has to satisfy correctness, i.e., when
the distinguisher always puts back the same state Bob should decrypt correctly.
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One can easily see that this holds, since in the real world, the state will be flipped
on Alice’s side and be flipped back on Bob side, thus the distinguisher will get
the same state back at interface B.
Suppose now that one has a PRF resource and a bound PRF satisfying Eq. (12),
that is, indistinguishable from URF within PRF, the following corollary follows
trivially from the composition theorem Theorem 5 in Appendix B.
Corollary 4.[
IC`,m+ν ,KEYr,PRFr,ν,2m,PRFr,ν,2m,QC`,m,m+νA ,QC
`,m,m+ν
B
]
pi′AB ,−−−→
[
PMCC`,m,QC2`,m,m+νE
]
.
where pi′AB = (piAB, pi
PRF), (D) = PRF(DC) + `22−ν and C is the system including
piAB, IC
`,m+ν ,QC`,m,m+νA ,QC
`,m,m+ν
B .
4 Relations to Game-Based Security Definitions
In this section we explore the relations between our constructive security defini-
tions and two game based security definitions for (specific protocols making use
of) symmetric quantum encryption schemes, both introduced in [AGM18]. The
two notions we consider are those of quantum ciphertexts indistinguishability un-
der adaptive chosen-ciphertext attack (AGM-QCCA2) and quantum authenticated
encryption (QAE). Both definitions are inspired by classical security notions which
intrinsically require the ability to copy data, which in [AGM18] were successfully
translated into quantum analogue by circumventing the no-cloning theorem.
We will first show that QAE security exactly implies the constructive cryptog-
raphy security notion of constructing a secure channel from an insecure one and
a shared secret key, which we call CC-QSEC (but is actually stronger, and thus we
also show a separation). Secondly, we will relate the AGM-QCCA2 security defini-
tion to the constructive cryptography security notion of constructing a confidential
channel from an insecure one and a shared secret key, which we call CC-QCNF,
but the implication will be less direct. In fact, we introduce two new (interme-
diate) game-based security definitions, RRC-QCCA2 and RRO-QCCA2, and show
that:
1. The classical versions of AGM-QCCA2 and RRC-QCCA2 are asymptotically
equivalent;
2. For a restricted class of schemes, RRC-QCCA2 implies RRO-QCCA2 (they are
actually equivalent);
3. RRO-QCCA2 implies CC-QCNF (but is actually stronger).
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We leave open the question whether it is possible to generalize (2.) to general
schemes. Throughout this section we will assume that the plaintext and the ci-
phertext spaces comprise elements of the same length, an thus ignore the corre-
sponding superscripts for channels and quantum computers.
4.1 Background and Notation
In [BCG+02], a characterization of any symmetric quantum encryption schemes
(SQES) was given, which states that encryption works by attaching some (pos-
sibly) key-dependent auxiliary state, and applying a unitary operator, and de-
cryption undoes the unitary, and then checks whether the support of the state
in the auxiliary register has changed. Thus, as pointed out in [AGM18], for key-
generation function Gen (inducing a probability distribution over some key-space
K), encryption function Enc, and decryption function Dec, we can characterize a
SQES S := (Gen, Enc, Dec) as follows.
Lemma 3 ([AGM18, Corollary 1]). Let S = (Gen, Enc, Dec) be a SQES. Then
for every k ∈ K there exists a probability distribution pk : R → [0, 1] and a family
of quantum states {|ψk,r〉T }r∈R, with ΠTk,r := |ψk,r〉〈ψk,r|T , such that:
– Enck(%
M ) := Vk
(
%M ⊗ΠTk,r
)
V †k , where r is sampled according to pk;
– Deck(σ
C) := TrT
(
P Tωk(V
†
k σ
CVk)P
T
ωk
)
+ Dˆk
(
P¯ Tωk(V
†
k σ
CVk)P¯
T
ωk
)
;
where P Tωk and P¯
T
ωk
are the orthogonal projectors onto the support of
ωTk :=
∑
r∈R
pk(r) ·ΠTk,r =
∑
r∈R
pk(r) · |ψk,r〉〈ψk,r|T .
For a SQES S, we define a security notion XXX in terms of the advantage
AdvxxxS,D of a distinguisher D in solving some (usually distinction) problem involv-
ing S. In the asymptotic setting, security of S according to notion XXX should be
interpreted as AdvxxxS,D being negligible for every D from some class D of distin-
guishers (usually, efficient distinguishers). Following the finite security approach,
here we are just interested in relating advantages of different notions, making use
of black-box reductions. Therefore, for a second notion YYY, we say that XXX
(security) implies YYY (security) if and only if AdvyyyS,D ≤ c ·AdvxxxS,DC, for some
c ≥ 1, where C denotes the black-box reduction that uses the distinguisher D for
YYY to make a new distinguisher DC for XXX.
When describing experiments involving interaction between a distinguisher17
D and a game system G, we use pseudo-code from G’s perspective, that is, the
return statement indicates what is output by the latter. Note that this implies
17We understand the distinguisher D as stateful, which can therefore be invoked multiple
times (without making explicit the various updated states).
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that for distinction problems we always make the game system output the bit
output by the distinguisher. In this case we use the expression D[G] to denote
the bit output by D after interacting with G. On the other hand, if the output
bit is decided by G (as is the case for the AGM-QCCA2 definition, restated in
Appendix E, which is not a distinction problem), we use the expression G[D].
Moreover, we use both expressions not only for the returned value, but also for
denoting the whole random experiments. When specifying that a distinguisher D
has access to a list of oracles, e.g. O1(·) and O2(·), we write x ← DO1(·),O2(·),
where the variable x holds the value output by D after the interaction with the
oracles. We denote the application of a two-outcome projective measurement, e.g.
{P Tωk ,1 − P Tωk}, as {P Tωk ,1 − P Tωk} ⇒ b, where b ∈ {0, 1} is the result of the
measurement (we associate 0 to the the first outcome and 1 to the second). The
state |φ0〉 is the EPR pair (one of the Bell state), to which we associate the two-
outcome projective measurement {Π+,1−Π+}. Furthermore, by XY ← |φ0〉 we
mean that the EPR pair has been prepared on registers XY , and we use τX as
a shorthand for the reduced state in register X, that is, half of a maximally-
entangled state. Finally, we use sans-serif font for boolean labels, e.g. cheat, and
by the expression cheat ?x:y we mean the value x if cheat is true (1), and the
value y otherwise (false, 0).
4.2 Relating QAE and CC-QSEC
In this section we first present the quantum authenticated encryption security
definition introduced in [AGM18], and then show that it directly implies our
constructive security notion CC-QSEC of constructing a secure channel from an
insecure one and a shared secret key.
QAE Security Definition ([AGM18]). We begin by restating what it means
for a SQES S to be secure in the QAE sense according to [AGM18]. On a high
level, a distinguisher D must not be able to distinguish between two scenarios: in
the first (the real one), it has access to regular encryption and decryption oracles,
whereas in the second (the ideal one), it has access to an encryption oracle which
replaces its queried plaintexts by random ones (half of a maximally-entangled
state), and a decryption oracle that normally decrypts ciphertext not returned by
the encryption oracle, but answers with the originally queried plaintexts otherwise
(thus not really performing correct decryption). Note that this security notion,
as shown in [AGM18], when phrased classically is equivalent to the canonical no-
tion of authenticated encryption (dubbed IND-CCA3 by Shrimpton in [Shr04]).
The only difference with the latter, is that the decryption oracle returns ⊥ when
queried on ciphertexts previously returned by the encryption oracle. But crucially,
this detail is what would not make it possible to adapt IND-CCA3 into a quantum
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definition: returning ⊥ would require the game to copy data (store the cipher-
texts returned by the encryption oracle, and then compare them to each query
to the decryption oracle), which is not allowed in general in the quantum world.
Nevertheless, the formulation of QAE introduced in [AGM18] works quantumly
because, intuitively, “it is possible to compare random states generated as half of a
maximally-entangled state”: the trick consists of first ignoring (but storing) each
plaintext submitted by the adversary to the encryption oracle, and then, for each
plaintext, prepare an EPR pair |φ0〉, encrypt just half of it, and store the other
half (as well as the involved randomness) together with the original plaintext sub-
mitted by the distinguisher; then the decryption oracle normally decrypts each
ciphertext, and subsequently applies a projective measurement on the support of
|φ0〉 to the obtained plaintext against each stored half, and the associated orig-
inal plaintext can thus be easily retrieved. We now restate the definition from
[AGM18] (Definition 10 therein), adapted to our notation, and in the concrete
setting (as opposed to the asymptotic one).
Definition 10 (QAE Security [AGM18]). For SQES S := (Gen, Enc, Dec) (im-
plicit in all defined systems) we define the QAE-advantage of S for distinguisher
D as
AdvqaeS,D := Pr
[
D[Gqae-real] = 1
]
− Pr
[
D[Gqae-ideal] = 1
]
,
where the interactions of D with game systems Gqae-real and Gqae-ideal are defined
in Figure 10.
QAE Implies CC-QSEC. Here we denote by Gqae-real,` and Gqae-ideal,` the games
Gqae-real and Gqae-ideal where the distinguisher is allowed to make at most ` queries
to each oracle (and analogously for Advqae,`S,D ).
Theorem 3. Let S := (Gen, Enc, Dec) be a SQES (implicit in all defined sys-
tems). Then with protocol piq-encAB = (pi
q-enc
A , pi
q-enc
B ) making use of quantum com-
puters QC`A and QC
`
B as defined in Figure 11, simulator sim
qae
E making use of
quantum computer QC`E as defined in Figure 12 (until the dashed line), and (triv-
ial) reduction system C as specified in the proof, for any distinguisher D we have
∆D(piq-encAB [KEY, IC
`,QC`A,QC
`
B], sim
qae
E [SC
`,QC`E ]) ≤ Advqae,`S,DC.
Proof. Let R := piq-encAB [KEY, IC
`,QC`A,QC
`
B] and S := sim
qae
E [SC
`,QC`E ]. We need
to provide a reduction system C so that distinguishing between the games Gqae-real,`
and Gqae-ideal,` can be reduced to distinguishing between resources R and S. Let D
be a distinguisher for R and S. Then we define an adversary D′ = DC with access
to real/ideal encryption oracle Enc(·) and real/ideal decryption oracle Dec(·)
provided by Gqae-real,`/Gqae-ideal,`, where C behaves as follows towards D:
Composable and Finite Computational Security of Quantum Message Trans. 35
Experiments D[Gqae-real] and D[Gqae-ideal] for SQES S := (Gen, Enc, Dec)
k ← Gen()
return DEnck(·),Deck(·)
k ← Gen()
M← ∅
return DEnc(·),Dec(·)
oracle Enc(%M ):
rˆ
pk←− R
MˆM˜ ← |φ0〉
σˆCˆ ← Vk(%ˆMˆ ⊗ΠTk,rˆ)V †k . Ignore %M
M←M∪ {(rˆ, M˜ ,M)}
return σˆCˆ
oracle Dec(σC):
MˆT ← V †k σCVk
for each (rˆ, M˜ ,M) ∈M do
if {Πk,rˆ,1−Πk,rˆ}(ωT )⇒ 0 then
if {Π+,1−Π+}(ϕMˆM˜ )⇒ 0 then
return %M
return |⊥〉〈⊥|
Fig. 10. QAE security games Gqae-real (left) and Gqae-ideal (right).
piq-encA QC
`
A
1. QC`A request the key k from KEY and
stores it in its memory.
2. For the i-th input %M at the out-
side interface, QC`A samples randomness
r
pk←− R, computes the ciphertext σC ←
Vk(%
M⊗ΠTk,r)V †k , and outputs σC at the
inside interface to IC`.
piq-encB QC
`
B
1. QC`B request the key k from KEY and
stores it in its memory.
2. For the i-th input σC at the inside in-
terface from IC`, QC`B computes MT ←
Vkσ
CV †k , and if {PTωk ,1−PTωk}(ωT )⇒ 0,
outputs the plaintext message %M at the
outside interface.
Fig. 11. Encryption and decryption protocols.
– Interface A: On input message %, output Enc(%) at interface E.
– Interface E: On input state σ, output Dec(σ) at interface B.
Note that we trivially have that CGqae-real,` ≡ R and CGqae-ideal,` ≡ S, hence
Advqae,`S,DC = Pr
[
DC[Gqae-real,`] = 1
]
− Pr
[
DC[Gqae-ideal,`] = 1
]
= Pr
[
D[CGqae-real,`] = 1
]
− Pr
[
D[CGqae-ideal,`] = 1
]
= Pr[D[R] = 1]− Pr[D[S] = 1]
= ∆D(R,S).
This concludes the proof.
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simqae,`E QC
`
E / sim
qcca2,`
E QC
`
E
1. QC`E generates a key k ← Gen(), stores it in its memory, and sets M← ∅.
2. QC`E performs the following two tasks in parallel:
(a) For the i-th input newMsg at the inside interface from SC`, QC`E samples randomness
rˆ
pk←− R, prepares MˆM˜ ← |φ0〉, computes σC ← Vk(%ˆMˆ ⊗ ΠTk,rˆ)V †k , and outputs
the ciphertext σC at the outside interface. Finally, it performs the update M ←
M∪ {(rˆ, M˜ , i)}.
(b) For the i-th input σC at the outside interface, QC`E computes MˆT ← V †k σCVk.
Then for each (rˆ, M˜ , j) ∈ M, it computes {Πk,rˆ,1 − Πk,rˆ}(ωT ); if the result
of the measurement is 0, then it computes {Π+,1 − Π+}(ϕMˆM˜ ); if the result of
the measurement is again 0, then it outputs the index j at the inside interface to SC`.
Otherwise, it computes {PTωk ,1− PTωk}(ωT ), and if the result of the measurement is
0, then it outputs the message %ˆMˆ at the inside interface to SC`.
Fig. 12. QAE (until the dashed line) and QCCA2 (until the end) simulators.
Corollary 5. With ε(D) := supD′∈B(D) Adv
qae,`
S,D′ , we have[
KEY, IC`,QC`A,QC
`
B
]
piq-encAB ,ε−−−−−→
[
SC`,QC`E
]
,
where the class B(D) is defined in Eq. (6), Section 2.1.
QAE is Stronger than CC-QSEC. We remark that even though QAE implies
CC-QSEC, the converse is not true. In particular, we find that QAE is an (un-
necessarily) stronger notion than CC-QSEC. We can in fact show that there are
SQESs that satisfy CC-QSEC, but not QAE. Following [CKN03], in order to show
this fact it suffices to take any SQES S which is QAE secure, and slightly modify
it into a new SQES S′ so that a classical 0-bit is appended to every encryption,
which is then ignored upon decryption. Now an adversary can flip the bit of a
ciphertext that it got from the encryption oracle, and then query the decryption
oracle on the new ciphertext: in the real setting it will get back the original mes-
sage, while in the ideal setting it will get back |⊥〉〈⊥|, and can thus perfectly
distinguish between the two, hence S′ cannot be QAE secure. On the other hand,
S′ is still CC-QSEC secure because it can still be used to achieve the construction
of a secure channel from an insecure one and a shared secret key. This is possible
by using a simulator which works essentially as simqae,`E QC
`
E from Figure 12, but
which ignores the bit.
4.3 Relating QCCA2 and CC-QCNF
The goal of this section is to present and relate several QCCA2 security definitions.
The original AGM-QCCA2 definition from [AGM18] is restated in Appendix E.
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In this section we begin by introducing a new definition, RRC-QCCA2 (where
RRC stands for “real-or-random challenge”), which is similar to AGM-QCCA2.
Both notions define a challenge phase, and thus we introduce a third variant,
RRO-QCCA2 (where RRO stands for “real-or-random oracles”), in which there
is no real-or-random challenge, but rather access to real-or-random oracles. Cru-
cially, the latter is identical to QAE as introduced by [AGM18], up to a small
detail: upon decryption, if the ciphertext was not generated by the encryption or-
acle, instead of returning |⊥〉〈⊥|, return the decrypted plaintext. Finally, we show
that for a restricted class of SQESs, RRC-QCCA2 implies RRO-QCCA2, and for
any SQESs, RRO-QCCA2 implies CC-QCNF.
RRC-QCCA2 Security Definition. We now introduce an alternative game-
based security definition that seems more natural than AGM-QCCA2. This notion
is defined in terms of a distinction problem (as opposed to AGM-QCCA2), and
essentially it is analogous to the test setting of the latter, Gqcca2-test, but where
the decryption oracle provided to the distinguisher behaves differently: after the
real-or-random challenge phase, upon querying the challenge ciphertext, it will
respond with the plaintext originally submitted by the distinguisher, in both the
real and ideal settings. Note that this is possible in the ideal setting, because we
make use of the same trick as in Gqcca2-fake, but we do not just set a flag whenever
we detect that the adversary is cheating, but rather return the original message
that it submitted as challenge. Since a similar behavior is implemented in the real
setting, the adversary must really be able to distinguish between ciphertexts in
order to win.
Definition 11 (RRC-QCCA2 Security). For SQES S := (Gen, Enc, Dec) (im-
plicit in all defined systems) we define the RRC-QCCA2-advantage of S for dis-
tinguisher D as
Advrrc-qcca2S,D := Pr
[
D[Grrc-qcca2-real] = 1
]
− Pr
[
D[Grrc-qcca2-ideal] = 1
]
,
where the interactions of D with game systems Grrc-qcca2-real and Grrc-qcca2-ideal are
defined in Figure 13.
RRO-QCCA2 Security Definition. In order to relate the latter definition with
a constructive notion of confidentiality, it is helpful to have a game-based secu-
rity definition which analogously to QAE defines a real and an ideal setting (by
specifying real-or-random oracles, and in particular, not only a real-or-random
challenge). We do this by introducing the notion RRO-QCCA2, which can be seen
as a natural extension of RRC-QCCA2.
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Experiments Grrc-qcca2-real[D] and Grrc-qcca2-ideal[D] for SQES S := (Gen, Enc, Dec)
k ← Gen()
%M ← DEnck(·),Deck(·)
σC ← Enck(%M )
b′ ← DEnck(·),Deck(·)(σC)
return b′
k ← Gen()
%¯M¯ ← DEnck(·),Deck(·) . Keep %¯M¯
rˆ
pk←− R . Keep rˆ
MˆM˜ ← |φ0〉
σˆCˆ ← Vk(%ˆMˆ ⊗ΠTk,rˆ)V †k . Ignore %¯M
b′ ← DEnck(·),Dec(·)(σˆCˆ)
return b′
oracle Dec(σC):
MT ← V †k σCVk
if {PTωk ,1− PTωk}(ωT )⇒ 0 then
if {Πk,rˆ,1−Πk,rˆ}(ωT )⇒ 0 then
if {Π+,1−Π+}(ϕMM˜ )⇒ 0 then
return %¯M¯ . Original challenge
else
return Dˆk(ρ
MT ) . Invalid ciphertext
return %M
Fig. 13. RRC-QCCA2 games Grrc-qcca2-real (left) and Grrc-qcca2-ideal (right).
Definition 12 (RRO-QCCA2 Security). For SQES S := (Gen, Enc, Dec) (im-
plicit in all defined systems) we define the RRO-QCCA2-advantage of S for dis-
tinguisher D as
Advrro-qcca2S,D := Pr
[
D[Grro-qcca2-real] = 1
]
− Pr
[
D[Grro-qcca2-ideal] = 1
]
,
where the interactions of D with game systems Grro-qcca2-real and Grro-qcca2-ideal are
defined in Figure 14.
Relating AGM-QCCA2 and RRC-QCCA2. We feel that RRC-QCCA2 is a much
simpler and more natural definition than AGM-QCCA2. In fact, in [AGM18] the
authors claim that AGM-QCCA2 is a “natural” security definition based on the
fact that its classical analogon is shown to be equivalent to (a variation of) the
standard classical IND-CCA2 security definition. We claim that our RRC-QCCA2 is
more natural in the sense that it is formulated as a normal distinction problem (as
opposed to AGM-QCCA2), and its classical analogon can be shown to be equivalent
to standard classical IND-CCA2 security much more directly (in particular, with
no concrete security loss, as opposed to AGM-QCCA2, where it is shown that the
concrete reduction has a factor 2 security loss).
Similarly as done in [AGM18] for QAE, whose classical restriction was shown
to be equivalent to the common classical notion of authenticated encryption
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Experiments D[Grro-qcca2-real] and D[Grro-qcca2-ideal] for SQES S := (Gen, Enc, Dec)
k ← Gen()
return DEnck(·),Deck(·)
k ← Gen()
M← ∅
return DEnc(·),Dec(·)
oracle Enc(%M ):
rˆ
pk←− R
MˆM˜ ← |φ0〉
σˆCˆ ← Vk(%ˆMˆ ⊗ΠTk,rˆ)V †k . Ignore %M
M←M∪ {(rˆ, M˜ ,M)}
return σˆCˆ
oracle Dec(σC):
MˆT ← V †k σCVk
for each (rˆ, M˜ ,M) ∈M do
if {Πk,rˆ,1−Πk,rˆ}(ωT )⇒ 0 then
if {Π+,1−Π+}(ϕMˆM˜ )⇒ 0 then
return %M
if {PTωk ,1− PTωk}(ωT )⇒ 0 then
return %ˆMˆ
else
return Dˆk(ρ
MˆT ) . Invalid ciphertext
Fig. 14. RRO-QCCA2 games Grro-qcca2-real (left) and Grro-qcca2-ideal (right).
IND-CCA3 from [Shr04], we now show that our RRC-QCCA2 security notion,
when casted to a classical definition, dubbed RRC-CCA2, is equivalent (in par-
ticular, with no loss factors, as opposed to AGM-QCCA2) to a common classical
notion of IND-CCA2. The latter definition is the same mentioned in [AGM18], and
comprises a real-or-random challenge, but the decryption oracle returns ⊥ upon
submitting the challenge ciphertext. On the other hand, RRC-CCA2 behaves ex-
actly the same as IND-CCA2, except that it always returns the challenge plaintext
as originally submitted by the adversary upon querying the challenge ciphertext,
independently from the (real or ideal) setting.
Lemma 4. RRC-CCA2 and IND-CCA2 are equivalent.
Proof. To transform RRC-CCA2 into IND-CCA2, the reduction simply stores the
challenge ciphertext cˆ, and returns ⊥ whenever the decryption oracle is queried
upon cˆ. To transform IND-CCA2 into RRC-CCA2, the reduction simply stores the
challenge plaintext mˆ and the challenge ciphertext cˆ, and returns mˆ whenever the
decryption oracle is queried upon cˆ.
RRC-QCCA2 Implies RRO-QCCA2. As above, here we add as superscript the
parameter ` to games and advantages to denote that the distinguisher is allowed
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to make at most ` queries to the oracles. Note that we relate RRC-QCCA2 and
RRO-QCCA2 for only the subclass of SQESs which satisfy the following condition.
Condition 1. SQES S is such that the auxiliary state does not depend on the
key (but possibly on the randomness), and it appends explicitly the randomness to
the ciphertext, that is:
Enck(%
M ) = Uk,r(%
M ⊗ΠTr )U †k,r ⊗ |r〉〈r|R,
for some unitary Uk,r depending on both the key k and the randomness r.
We remark that this restriction still captures all the explicit protocols considered
in [AGM18].
Lemma 5. Let S be a SQES satisfying Condition 1. Then for reduction system
CI as specified in the proof, for any distinguisher D we have
Advrro-qcca2,`S,D ≤ ` ·Advrrc-qcca2,`−1S,DCI .
Proof. We need to provide a reduction system Ci, parameterized on an index
i ∈ {1, . . . , `}, so that distinguishing between the two games Grrc-qcca2-real,`−1
and Grrc-qcca2-ideal,`−1 can be reduced to distinguishing between Grro-qcca2-real,` and
Grro-qcca2-ideal,`. Let D be a distinguisher for Grro-qcca2-real,` and Grro-qcca2-ideal,`.
Then we define an adversary D′ = DCI , where I is a uniform random variable
over {1, . . . , `}, with access to encryption oracle Enc(·), decryption oracle Dec(·),
and challenge oracle Chall(·), provided by Grrc-qcca2-real,`/Grrc-qcca2-ideal,`, where Ci
internally keeps a setM and exports oracles Enc′(·) and Dec′(·) towards D which
behave as follows:
– Oracle Enc′(·): on input the j-th message %M :
• If j < i:
1. MˆM˜ ← |φ0〉.
2. σˆCˆ ⊗ |rˆ〉〈rˆ|R ← Enc(%ˆMˆ ).
3. M←M∪ {(rˆ, M˜ ,M)}.
4. Return σˆCˆ ⊗ |rˆ〉〈rˆ|R.
• If j = i: return Chall(%M ).
• If j > i: return Enc(%M ).
– Oracle Dec′(·): on input ciphertext σC ⊗ |r〉〈r|R:
1. %ˆMˆ ← Dec(σC ⊗ |r〉〈r|R).
2. If %ˆMˆ = |⊥〉〈⊥|, return |⊥〉〈⊥|, otherwise proceed.
3. For each (rˆ, M˜ ,M) ∈ M do the following: if {Πrˆ,1 − Πrˆ}(ωT ) ⇒ 0 and
{Π+,1−Π+}(ϕMˆM˜ )⇒ 0, return %M , otherwise proceed.
4. Return |⊥〉〈⊥|.
Let now define the hybrid systems Hi resulting from attaching the reduction sys-
tem Ci to the real RRC-QCCA2 game, that is, define Hi := CiG
rrc-qcca2-real,`−1.
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Then observe that Hi+1 ≡ CiGrrc-qcca2-ideal,`−1, H1 ≡ Grro-qcca2-real,`, and H`+1 ≡
Grro-qcca2-ideal,`. Finally, by the law of total probability, we have:
Advrrc-qcca2,`−1S,DC
= Pr
[
DC[Grrc-qcca2-real,`−1] = 1
]
− Pr
[
DC[Grrc-qcca2-ideal,`−1] = 1
]
=
1
`
∑`
i=1
(
Pr
[
D[CiG
rrc-qcca2-real,`−1] = 1
]
− Pr
[
D[CiG
rrc-qcca2-ideal,`−1] = 1
])
=
1
`
∑`
i=1
(Pr[D[Hi] = 1]− Pr[D[Hi+1] = 1])
=
1
`
· (Pr[D[H1] = 1]− Pr[D[H`+1] = 1])
=
1
`
·
(
Pr
[
D[Grro-qcca2-real,`] = 1
]
− Pr
[
D[Grro-qcca2-ideal,`] = 1
])
=
1
`
·Advrro-qcca2,`S,D .
This concludes the proof.
Remark 4. It is easy to show that the other direction of Lemma 5 also holds (for
the same class of SQES), that is, RRO-QCCA2 implies RRC-QCCA2. For this, the
reduction C flips a bit B˜ and uses the RRO-QCCA2 security game to emulate the
RRC-QCCA2 game, resulting in perfect emulation with probability 12 , and perfect
unguessability otherwise. Thus, with DC outputting 1 if and only if D correctly
guesses B˜, we have Advrrc-qcca2,`S,D ≤ 2 · Advrro-qcca2,`−1S,DC , and therefore the two
notions are asymptotically equivalent, as we formalize in the following lemma.
Lemma 6. For SQES satisfying Condition 1, RRC-QCCA2 and RRO-QCCA2 are
asymptotically equivalent.
Proof. This follows directly by Lemma 5 and Remark 4.
Just as we casted RRC-QCCA2 into the classical definition RRC-CCA2, we can
cast RRO-QCCA2 into RRO-CCA2. Then it is possible to obtain analogous results
as above for the classical notions (without restrictions on the (classical) encryption
scheme).
Corollary 6. RRC-CCA2 and RRO-CCA2 are asymptotically equivalent.
RRO-QCCA2 Implies CC-QCNF. We can now finally relate QCCA2 game-based
security definitions to the constructive cryptography notion of confidentiality,
CC-QCNF. We do that by showing that RRO-QCCA2 security implies CC-QCNF,
and therefore, by Lemma 5, so does RRC-QCCA2 (with concrete security loss
factor `).
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Theorem 4. Let S := (Gen, Enc, Dec) be a SQES (implicit in all defined sys-
tems). Then with protocol piq-encAB = (pi
q-enc
A , pi
q-enc
B ) making use of quantum com-
puters QC`A and QC
`
B (already defined in Figure 11 for Theorem 3), simulator
simqcca2E making use of quantum computer QC
`
E as defined in Figure 12 (until the
end), and (trivial) reduction system C as specified in the proof, for any distin-
guisher D we have
∆D(piq-encAB [KEY, IC
`,QC`A,QC
`
B], sim
qcca2
E [NMCC
`,QC`E ]) ≤ Advrro-qcca2,`S,DC .
Proof. Let R := piq-encAB [KEY, IC
`,QC`A,QC
`
B] and S := sim
qae
E [NMCC
`,QC`E ]. We
need to provide a reduction system C so that distinguishing between the games
Grro-qcca2-real,` and Grro-qcca2-ideal,` can be reduced to distinguishing between re-
sources R and S. Let D be a distinguisher for R and S. Then we define an adversary
D′ = DC with access to real/ideal encryption oracle Enc(·) and real/ideal decryp-
tion oracle Dec(·) provided by Grro-qcca2-real,`/Grro-qcca2-ideal,`, where C behaves as
follows towards D:
– Interface A: On input message %, output Enc(%) at interface E.
– Interface E: On input state σ, output Dec(σ) at interface B.
Note that we trivially have that CGrro-qcca2-real,` ≡ R and CGrro-qcca2-ideal,` ≡ S,
hence
Advrro-qcca2,`S,DC = Pr
[
DC[Grro-qcca2-real,`] = 1
]
− Pr
[
DC[Grro-qcca2-ideal,`] = 1
]
= Pr
[
D[CGrro-qcca2-real,`] = 1
]
− Pr
[
D[CGrro-qcca2-ideal,`] = 1
]
= Pr[D[R] = 1]− Pr[D[S] = 1]
= ∆D(R, S).
This concludes the proof.
Corollary 7. With ε(D) := supD′∈B(D) Adv
rro-qcca2,`
S,D′ , we have[
KEY, IC`,QC`A,QC
`
B
]
piq-encAB ,ε−−−−−→
[
NMCC`,QCqcca2,`E
]
,
where the class B(D) is defined in Eq. (6), Section 2.1.
Using Lemma 5, we finally obtain the following corollary.
Corollary 8. With ε(D) := supD′∈B(D) Adv
rrc-qcca2,`
S,D′ , we have[
KEY, IC`,QC`A,QC
`
B
]
piq-encAB ,(`+1)·ε−−−−−−−−→
[
NMCC`,QCqcca2,`E
]
,
where the class B(D) is defined in Eq. (6), Section 2.1.
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RRO-QCCA2 is Stronger than CC-QCNF. We remark that even though the
security notion RRO-QCCA2 implies CC-QCNF, the converse is not true for the
same reason outlined above for QAE and CC-QSEC: it is possible to show that
there are SQESs that satisfy CC-QCNF but not RRO-QCCA2 by applying the
same principle of extending a RRO-QCCA2 secure scheme into one which is not
anymore RRO-QCCA2, but still satisfies CC-QCNF.
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A Notation
Pauli Operators. We write Pk or Px,z to denote a Pauli operator on m qubits,
where k = (x, z) are concatenation of two m-bits strings indicating in which qubit
bit flips and phase flips occur.
Pk = Px,z =
m⊗
i=1
Pxizi ,
where
Pab =

I a = 0, b = 0,
X a = 1, b = 0,
Z a = 0, b = 1,
XZ a = 1, b = 1.
Note that Pk = P
†
k , therefore we simply write PkρPk when applying a Pauli-
operator Pk on state ρ. To undo Pauli-operator Pk, we simply apply Pk again,
namely, PkPkρPkPk = ρ.
Bell Basis. We write |φ0〉 as the maximum entangled state of 2m qubits.
|φ0〉 =
( |00〉+ |11〉√
2
)⊗m
and |φk〉 as applying Pauli operator I⊗m ⊗ Pk on |φ0〉
|φk〉 = I⊗m ⊗ Pk |φ0〉 .
Then {|φk〉}k∈{0,1}2m forms the Bell basis for 2m qubits.
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Symplectic Inner Product. Symplectic inner product of two string k = (x, z) and
l = (x′, z′) of length 2m is given by
spl(k, l) =
m∑
i=1
xiz
′
i − x′izi.
Two Pauli operators Pk and Pl with k = (x, z) and l = (x
′, z′) commute (anti-
commute) if spl(k, l) equals to 0 (equals to 1) module 2. Hence for any Pk and
Pl,
PkPl = (−1)spl(k,l)PlPk.
For any strings k and l we have,∑
k∈{0,1}m
(−1)spl(k,l) =
{
2n l = 0,
0 l 6= 0,
where l = 0 means all bits of the string l are 0.
B Composition
In this section we prove that Eqs. (4) and (5) hold for the construction notion
from Definition 1.
Theorem 5 (Composition theorem). Suppose that pi1 constructs S from R
within ε1 and pi2 constructs T from S within ε2, i.e.,
R
pi1,ε1−−−→ S and S pi2,ε2−−−→ T.
Then it holds that
R
pi2pi1,ε1+ε2−−−−−−−→ T.
Furthermore, for any resource U, we have
[R,U]
pi1,ε′−−−→ [S,U],
with
ε′(D) := ε1(D[·,U]).
Proof. Let sim and sim′ be the simulators for which for all D, dD(pi1R, Ssim) ≤ ε(D)
and dD(pi2S,Tsim
′) ≤ ε(D). Then from the triangle inequality we have
dD(pi2pi1R, T sim
′sim) ≤ dD(pi2pi1R, pi2Ssim) + dD(pi2Ssim, T sim′sim)
= dD(pi1R,Ssim) + d
D(pi2S, T sim
′)
≤ ε1(D) + ε2(D).
Furthermore
dD(pi1[R,U], [S,U]sim) = d
D([pi1R,U], [Ssim,U])
≤ dD[·,U](pi1R, Ssim) ≤ ε1(D[·,U]).
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C Quantum One-Time Pad
Here we show that the quantum one-time pad constructs a one-time Pauli-mal-
leable confidential quantum channel PMCC
1,m
from a one-time insecure quantum
channel IC
1,m
and a key resource KEY2m. Note that PMCC and IC are a slightly
modified versions of PMCC and IC. Which work as follows: after getting an input
at interface E, the channels reject any input at interface A. A weaker statement
has appeared in [DFPR14], where it was proven that the one-time pad constructs
a confidential channel — i.e., one which allows the adversary to make arbitrary
changes, but only leaks the message size — which is strictly weaker than the re-
source PMCC
1,m
proven to be constructed here.
The protocol is described in Figure 15. The construction also gives Eve certain
computation power. We present the simulator simq-otp and the quantum computer
of Eve QCq-otp in Figure 16 such that the ideal channel connecting with the sim-
ulator and Eve’s quantum computer can be proved equivalent to the system of
Alice’s and Bob’s converters, quantum computers connecting with the insecure
channel and the key resource.
Lemma 7. Let piAB = (piA, piB),QC
1,m,m
A ,QC
1,m,m
B , sim
q-otp,QCq-otp denote the
converters, simulator and computing resources described in Figure 15 and Fig-
ure 16. Then for any distinguisher D, we have
dD
(
piAB
[
IC
1,m
,KEY2m,QC1,m,mA ,QC
1,m,m
B
]
, simq-otp
[
PMCC
1,m
,QCq-otp
])
= 0.
Proof. We first consider the simpler case that distinguisher only inputs at interface
E. In both worlds, the distinguisher prepares an arbitrary state ρAE and inputs
ρA at interface E. In the real world, the protocal applies a Pauli operator Pk on
the state and then output at interface B. The distinguisher has state
Φreal =
1
22m
∑
k∈{0,1}2m
PAk ρ
AEPAk .
In the ideal world, since no newMsg has arrived yet, the simulator output ⊥ to
channel PMCC
1,m
and the channel outputs a fully mixed state 12m I at interface
B. The distinguisher has state
Φideal =
1
2m
I ⊗ ρE
It is easy to see that for any mixed state ρAE ,
1
22m
∑
k∈{0,1}2m
PAk ρ
AEPAk =
1
2m
I ⊗ ρE
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piA piB QCA QCB
1. piA, piB : Alice and Bob obtain uniform key k from key resource KEY.
2. piA: Alice inputs message ρ
A and requests her computer to encrypt ρA with Pk.
3. QCA: On input ρ
A, the computer apply Pauli operator Pk on the state ρ
A and outputs
σ = Pkρ
APk to Alice.
4. piA: Alice sends ciphertext σ to Bob through insecure quantum channel IC.
5. piB : Bob receives ciphertext σ˜ and requests his computer to decrypt σ˜ with Pk.
6. QCB : On input σ˜, the computer apply Pauli operator Pk on the state σ˜. Then the com-
puter outputs ρ˜ = Pkσ˜Pk to Bob.
7. piB : Bob outputs the decrypted message ρ˜
B .
Fig. 15. Converters and computer resources to construct PMCC
1,m
from IC
1,m
. The quan-
tum computer QC1,m,mA and QC
1,m,m
B will be requested 1 time. The plaintext and ciphertext
both have length m. KEY2m gives a shared key of length 2m.
simq-otp QCq-otp
1. simq-otp: On input newMsg from the ideal channel PMCC
1,m
, it requests QCq-otp to provide
a quantum state and outputs the state at interface E.
2. simq-otp: On input σ˜ at interface E, it requests QCq-otp to provide a key k of length 2m
(or ⊥). The key (or ⊥) is then forwarded to ideal channel PMCC1,m.
3. QCq-otp: On input newMsg from simq-otp, the computer prepares a maximum entangled
state |φ0〉〈φ0|MC in register M and C. The computer stores ρM in register M in its internal
memory and outputs the state ρC in register C to simE .
4. QCq-otp : On input ρ˜C from interface E, if ρM is stored internally, the computer measures
ρ˜MC in the bell basis and gets measurement result k˜. The computer outputs k˜ to simq-otp.
If no ρM is stored, then no newMsg has arrived yet, the computer outputs ⊥ to simq-otp.
Fig. 16. The simulator simq-otp and computer resource QCq-otp connecting to the ideal
resource PMCC
1,m
. QCq-otp is capable of doing 1 encryption and 1 decryption.
and therefore we have
Φreal = Φideal.
Now we consider the more complicated case that distinguisher first input at
interface A and then at interface E. In both worlds, the distinguisher prepares
an arbitrary state ρAE and a CPTP map Λ. In the real world, the distinguisher
inputs ρA at interface A. After getting the flipped (Alice applying a Pauli operator
Pk) state Pkρ
APk at interface E , the distinguisher applies the CPTP map Λ on
register A and E. Then the distinguisher inputs the result state ρ˜Ain register
A into the insecure channel IC
1,m
. Then the distinguisher gets the flipped (Bob
applying a Pauli operator Pk) state output at interface B. The distinguisher holds
state Φreal
Φreal =
1
22m
∑
k∈{0,1}2m
PAk Λ
AE(PAk ρ
AEPAk )P
A
k .
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In the ideal world, the distinguisher inputs ρA at interface A. The simulator
prepares a maximum entangled state |φ0〉〈φ0|MC in register M and C and outputs
the state σC in register C at interface E. The distinguisher applies the CPTP map
Λ on register C and E. Then the distinguisher inputs the result state σ˜C in register
C into the channel. The simulator measures the state in register M and C on bell
basis, get the measurement result k and the channel applies Pauli operator Pk on
the state in register A. After getting the modified state output from interface B,
the distinguisher holds state Φideal.
σ˜AMCE = ΛCE(|φ0〉〈φ0|MC ⊗ ρAE)
Φideal = TrMC
∑
k∈{0,1}2m
(PAk ⊗ |φk〉〈φk|MC)σ˜AMCE(PAk ⊗ |φk〉〈φk|MC).
We prove that for any ρAE and CPTP map ΛXE , where register X is A in the
real world and C in the ideal world, we have Φreal = Φideal.
For any CPTP map ΛXE applying on state ρXE on register X and E, we can
decompose the map as
ΛXE(ρXE) =
∑
i
ΓXEi ρ
XEΓXE†i
=
∑
i
(
∑
p
PXp ⊗ ΓEi,p)ρXE(
∑
q
PXq ⊗ ΓE†i,q )
=
∑
i,p,q
(PXp ⊗ ΓEi,p)ρXE(PXq ⊗ ΓE†i,q ) (14)
Plugging Eq. (14) into σ˜AMCE , we get
σ˜AMCE = ΛCE(|φ0〉〈φ0|MC ⊗ ρAE)
=
∑
i,p,q
(PCp ⊗ ΓEi,p)(|φ0〉〈φ0|MC ⊗ ρAE)(PCq ⊗ ΓE†i,q )
=
∑
i,p,q
PCp |φ0〉〈φ0|MCPCq ⊗ (ΓEi,pρAEΓE†i,q )
=
∑
i,p,q
|φp〉〈φq|MC ⊗ (ΓEi,pρAEΓE†i,q ),
where |φp〉MC = PCp |φ0〉MC , see Appendix A.
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Now we can express Φideal as
Φideal = TrMC
∑
k,i,p,q
(PAk ⊗ |φk〉〈φk|MC)σ˜AMCE(PAk ⊗ |φk〉〈φk|MC)
= TrMC
∑
k,i,p,q
(PAk ⊗ |φk〉〈φk|MC)((ΓEi,pρAEΓE†i,q )⊗ |φp〉〈φq|MC)(PAk ⊗ |φk〉〈φk|MC)
= TrMC
∑
k,i,p,q
(PAk ⊗ ΓEi,pρAEPAk ⊗ ΓE†i,q )⊗ (|φk〉〈φk|MC |φp〉〈φq|MC |φk〉〈φk|MC)
= TrMC
∑
k,i
(PAk ⊗ ΓEi,kρAEPAk ⊗ ΓE†i,k)⊗ |φk〉〈φk|MC
=
∑
k,i
PAk ⊗ ΓEi,kρAEPAk ⊗ ΓE†i,k
Plugging Eq. (14) into Φreal, we get
Φreal =
1
22m
∑
k
PAk Λ
AE(PAk ρ
AEPAk )P
A
k
=
1
22m
∑
k
PAk (
∑
i,p,q
(PAp ⊗ ΓEi,p)PAk ρAEPAk (PAq ⊗ ΓE†i,q ))PAk
=
1
22m
∑
k,i,p,q
(PAk P
A
p P
A
k ⊗ ΓEi,p)ρAE(PAk PAq PAk ⊗ ΓE†i,q ).
Note that PkPp = (−1)spl(k,p)PpPk (see Appendix A), so we have
∑
k,p,q
PkPpPk(·)PkPqPk =
∑
k,p,q
(−1)spl(k,p)PpPkPk(·)(−1)spl(k,q)PqPkPk
=
∑
k,p,q
(−1)spl(k,p)+spl(k,q)Pp(·)Pq
=
∑
p,q
Pp(·)Pq
∑
k
(−1)spl(k,p⊕q)
=
∑
p⊕q=0
Pp(·)Pq · 22m
= 22m
∑
p
Pp(·)Pp.
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piA piB QC
A QCB
1. piA: Alice inputs a message ρ
Ai and requests her computer to encode ρAi .
2. QCA: On the i-th input ρAi , the computer appends state |i〉〈i| and outputs ψ = ρAi⊗|i〉〈i|
to Alice.
3. piA: Alice gets encoding ψ from her computer and sends ψ to Bob through secure quantum
channel SC.
4. piB : Bob receives encoding ψ˜ and requests his computer to decode ψ˜.
5. QCB : The computer keeps internal counter nextIndex, initially set to 0. After each output,
the computer increases nextIndex by 1.
6. QCB : On the input ψ˜, the computer takes the first m qubits as message ρ˜, measures the
last log ` qubits and obtains the measurement result ı˜. If ı˜ = nextIndex, the computer
outputs ρ˜ to Bob. Otherwise, the computer outputs ⊥ to Bob.
7. piB : Bob outputs the decoded message ρ˜
B .
Fig. 17. Converters and computing resources to construct OSC`,m from SC`,m+log `.
QC`,m,m+log `A and QC
`,m,m+log `
B will be requested ` times. The message has length m and
encoding has length m+ log `.
.
Therefore we can further simplify Φreal
Φreal =
1
22m
∑
k,i,p,q
(PAk P
A
p P
A
k ⊗ ΓEi,p)ρAE(PAk PAq PAk ⊗ ΓE†i,q )
=
1
22m
22m
∑
p,i
(PAp ⊗ ΓEi,p)ρAE(PAp ⊗ ΓE†i,p )
=
∑
p,i
PAp ⊗ ΓEi,pρAEPAp ⊗ ΓE†i,p .
Therefore for any state ρAE and CPTP map ΛXE , Φreal = Φideal.
D Constructing OSC`,m from SC`,m+log `
In this section we present a construction from a secure quantum channel to an
ordered secure quantum channel. In the protocol, Alice appends to each message
an index. When Bob receives the message, he checks the index. He accepts the
message only when the index is expected. The protocol works as following.
Theorem 6. Let piAB = (piA, piB), QC
`,m,m+log `
A and QC
`,m,m+log `
B denote con-
verters and computing resources corresponding to the protocol from Figure 17. Let
QC`E be a computing resource for Eve, capable of doing ` add operations. Then
piAB constructs an ordered secure quantum channel OSC
`,m from a secure quantum
channel SC`,m+log ` with  = 0, i.e.,[
SC`,m+log `,QC`,m,m+log `A ,QC
`,m,m+log `
B
]
piAB ,0−−−−→
[
OSC`,m,QC`E
]
.
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Proof. In order to prove this theorem, we need to find a simulator and a program
for Eve’s computer such that the real system and ideal system are indistinguish-
able with 0 advantage.
The simulator simE works as following. On input newMsg from the ideal re-
source OSC`,m, simE outputs newMsg at interface E. On input i at interface E,
simE inputs i to QC
`
E , requests it to output a send or skip signal and forwards the
signal to ideal resource OSC`.
Eve’s computer QC`E works as following. The computer keeps an internal
counter nextIndex, initially set to 0. On input i from simE , if i = nextIndex, it
outputs send to simE , otherwise, it outputs skip to simE . After the output, it
increases nextIndex by 1. The computer will be requested at most ` times.
One can see that the real system piAB
[
SC`,m+log `,QC`,m,m+log `A ,QC
`,m,m+log `
B
]
and the ideal world simE
[
OSC`,m,QC`E
]
are two equivalent systems. If the distin-
guisher reorders the messages, in both worlds, Bob will only receive messages with
consecutive indices. Therefore, two systems are equivalent and the distinguishing
advantage is 0.
Remark. Theorem 6 is meaningful only if the protocol also provides correctness.
This is trivially the case, since if the distinguisher is honest, i.e., always preserves
the order of messages, then Bob will receive them all in the correct order.
E AGM-QCCA2 Security Definition ([AGM18]).
Here we restate what it means for a SQES S to be secure in the AGM-QCCA2
sense according to [AGM18]. Contrary to the QAE definition, the authors did not
formulate AGM-QCCA2 in terms of a distinction problem (between a real and an
ideal setting); rather, the interaction of a distinguisher D with two different games
is considered:
– The first offers (true) encryption and decryption oracles, as well as a challenge
phase: D is required to input a plaintext, for which it will get back either
the true encryption, or the encryption of a random plaintext (τM , half of a
maximally-entangled state). D wins the game if it guesses which of the two
states was actually encrypted. After the challenge phase, D has still access to
the same oracles, and could therefore in principle trivially win the game by
submitting the challenge ciphertext and compare the result with the challenge
plaintext;
– The second game countermeasures this by exposing towards D the same game,
but where the challenge plaintext is always replaced by τM , and if D tries
to cheat by submitting the challenge ciphertext to the decryption oracle, it
instantly loses the game (and wins it with probability 12 otherwise).
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Then the advantage of D is measured as the probability of winning the first
game minus the probability of cheating in the second. The rationale behind this
definition is that D should not be able to have a larger probability of winning
the first game than of cheating in the second. We now state our adaption of the
corresponding definition from [AGM18] (Definition 9 therein).
Definition 13 (AGM-QCCA2 Security [AGM18]). For SQES (implicit in all
defined systems) S := (Gen, Enc, Dec), we define the AGM-QCCA2-advantage of
S for distinguisher D ∈ D as
Advagm-qcca2S,D := Pr
[
Gagm-qcca2-test[D] = 1
]− Pr[Gagm-qcca2-fake[D] = 1],
where the interactions of D with game systems Gagm-qcca2-test and Gagm-qcca2-fake
are defined in Figure 18.
Experiments Gagm-qcca2-test[D] and Gagm-qcca2-fake[D] for SQES S := (Gen, Enc, Dec)
b $← {0, 1}
k ← Gen()
%M ← DEnck(·),Deck(·)
if b = 1 then
σC ← Enck(%M )
else
σC ← Enck(τM )
b′ ← DEnck(·),Deck(·)(σC)
return 1{b′ = b}
b $← {0, 1}
k ← Gen()
cheat← 0
%M ← DEnck(·),Deck(·)
rˆ
pk←− R . Keep rˆ
MˆM˜ ← |φ0〉
σˆCˆ ← Vk(%ˆMˆ ⊗ΠTk,rˆ)V †k . Ignore %M
b′ ← DEnck(·),Dec(·)(σˆCˆ)
return cheat ? 1:b . Ignore b′
oracle Dec(σC):
MT ← V †k σCVk
if {PTωk ,1− PTωk}(ωT )⇒ 0 then
if {Πk,rˆ,1−Πk,rˆ}(ωT )⇒ 0 then
if {Π+,1−Π+}(ϕMM˜ )⇒ 0 then
cheat← 1
else
return Dˆk(ρ
MT ) . Invalid ciphertext
return %M
Fig. 18. AGM-QCCA2 games Gagm-qcca2-test (left) and Gagm-qcca2-fake (right).
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